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MIRANDA AND ITS (MORE RIGHTS-PROTECTIVE) INTERNATIONAL
COUNTERPARTS
Megan A. Fairlie, JD., LL.M, Ph.D.
ABSTRACT
Given that Miranda's warnings are nearly identically reproduced in
international criminal procedure, logic suggests that the rights of questioned
suspects are equally valuable-and equally valued-in both realms. But
history has its own logic, and Miranda's history in the United States
includes a steady erosion of its ability to safeguard the rights of suspects.
This is particularly true with respect to the limitations placed on Miranda's
custodial trigger and the lessening of the requirements for an effective
waiver. Recent efforts to eviscerate Miranda through these two channels,
including Berghuis v. Thompkins (2010) and Howes v. Fields (2012),
provide a stark contrast to the more rights-protective dictates of
international criminal justice. As a result, "international Miranda" is now
more faithful to both the text and intent of the Miranda opinion than current
domestic practice.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A popular sentiment, both at home and abroad, is that the U.S. Supreme
Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona, which requires that U.S. custodial
suspects be advised of certain rights before being questioned,' provides
protections that are fundamental to a fair trial and well worthy of imitation.
For "ordinary citizens" in the United States, "compliance with the Miranda
safeguards is widely considered an elementary prerequisite of fair procedure
and the decent restraint of police power."2 Foreign jurists have likewise
praised the decision as one that "provides the foundation for due process of
law of the detained person." 3 As a result, it is no surprise that warnings
virtually identical to those required by Miranda have become a mainstay in
contemporary international criminal procedure, nor that commentators keen
to establish the fairness of these proceedings are quick to emphasize this
Miranda parallel.4 Indeed, when this Miranda connection is made, it is
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 471 (1966).
2 Stephen J. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and
Vanishingly Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 500, 501 (1996).
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 118-19 (Mar. 31)
(separate opinion of Judge Sepulveda) (describing the Miranda warnings as "an integral part
of the United States system of constitutional rights").
4 See, e.g., Wolfgang Schomburg & Jan-Christoph Nemitz, The Protection of Human
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almost always designed to provide evidence that international criminal
courts provide due respect for the human rights of their suspects.5
Of course, international criminal courts ought not to be able to enhance
their perceived legitimacy by virtue of simply having incorporated
Miranda's warnings into their procedural regimes. What is more, despite the
popular support Miranda enjoys at home, the Miranda experiment simply
does not inspire comparable confidence within the U.S. legal community.
With many in this group concluding that Miranda's ability to protect
suspects from coerced interrogations has become "extremely limited,"6 the
presence of comparable warnings at international courts says little about the
fairness of international criminal proceedings. Accordingly, rather than
accept the assumption that the presence of Miranda analogs in international
criminal procedure contributes to the integrity of international criminal
proceedings, this work examines the truth of that assumption. In so doing,
this article establishes that international criminal practice in this area not
only enhances the credibility of the courts in this relatively nascent field, but
is actually more rights-protective than the Miranda doctrine currently in
place in the United States.
This article begins by providing a brief overview of the Miranda
decision, comparing the warnings required by it with the cautions provided
to international criminal suspects upon questioning. This work then
illustrates how the safeguards afforded in the international realm are more
expansively applied than under current U.S. doctrine. In so doing, it
demonstrates how the international approach is on the whole more closely
aligned with both the tenor and aim of the Miranda opinion than current
U.S. practice. In this vein, it illustrates how and why, despite the use of
discretionary rules of exclusion, international courts have consistently
evidenced a robust commitment to protecting the rights of interrogated
persons by refusing to admit improperly obtained statements. It concludes by
Rights of the Accused before the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, in FROM
HUMAN RIGHTS TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: STUDIES IN HONOUR OF AN AFRICAN
JURIST, THE LATE JUDGE LAITY KAMA 89, 92 (Emmanuel Decaux et al. eds., 2007)
(illustrating that the ICTR's approach to suspect interrogation adequately protects human
rights by bestowing protections that correspond to "Miranda Rights"); Stefan Trechsel, Rights
in Criminal Proceedings under the ECHR and the ICTY Statute A Precarious Comparison,
149, 161 in THE LEGACY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA, (Bert Swart et al. eds., 2011) (referring to the protection afforded by the ICTY
as a "Miranda warning").
See, e.g., Aaron Fichtelberg, Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal
Court, A Liberal Defence, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 765, 779 (2006); David Scheffer, Advancing
US Interests with the International Criminal Court, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 1567, 1571
(2003).
6 Sandra Guerra Thompson, Evading Miranda: How Seibert and Patane Failed to
"Save" Miranda, 40 VAL. U. L. REV. 645, 647 (2006).
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arguing that this trend ought to be continued at the International Criminal
Court7 ("ICC"), demonstrating that such an approach would enhance the
integrity of the ICC's proceedings and can be employed without unduly
hampering ICC prosecutions.
II. BACKGROUND
There can be little doubt that Miranda's warnings have infiltrated the
consciousness of much of the world's population. Just over a decade ago,
Justice Breyer estimated that "2 billion people throughout the world know
[that a U.S. custodial suspect] must be warned, prior to any questioning, that
he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against
him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and
that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him. . . that's a
hallmark of American justice"9
In fact, the impact of the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v.
Arizona has been felt both at home and overseas.' 0 The opinion is routinely
considered when foreign courts assess the fairness of suspect interrogationsII
and its safeguards have directly inspired investigatory reforms around the
globe.12 Miranda is credited abroad for "belong[ing] to the very essence of a
7 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998) U.N.
Doc. (1998), reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter Rome Statute].
' See George C. Thomas Ill & Richard A. Leo, The Effects of Miranda v. Arizona:
"Embedded" in our National Culture?, 29 CRIME & JUST. 203, 246 (2002) ("[T]he daily
stream of detective shows seems to have educated everyone (in America and abroad) about the
existence and content of the Miranda warning and waiver requirements.") See also Patt
Morrison, Op-Ed., Patt Morrison Asks: I" Prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, L.A. TIMES
(Nov. 19, 2011), http://articles.latimes.corn/2011/nov/19/opinion/la-oe-morrison-luia-moeno-
ocampo-20111119 ("[F]rom'Peny Mason' to 'Law & Order,' [American] TV teaches the
world about the law, and people like [it].... You exported the idea of justice.," as observed by
the first Prosecutor ofthe International Criminal Court, Louis Moreno-Ocampo).
' Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000)
(No. 99-5525), available at http://www.soc.umn.edu/-samaha/cases/dickerson_v_ustranscript
.htm.
"o See Stephen C. Thaman, "Fruits of the Poisonous Tree" in Comparative Law, 16 SW.
J. INT'L L. 333, 335 (2010) (noting that the Miranda decision "ha[s] been very influential
overseas").
" See, e.g., McGowan v. B., [2011] UKSC 54, [37] in which the Supreme Court of the
United Kingdom refers to the Miranda decision as "[t]he main source of comparative
jurisprudence on the issue of waiver by a suspect of the right of access to a lawyer while being
questioned by the police."
12 See, e.g., CONST. art. Ill, sec. 12(1) (Phil.); Philippine National Police Operational
Procedures R.15, § I (dictating that an "arresting officer... must inform the person arrested,
detained or under custodial investigation of ....[his] rights under the Miranda Doctrine");
Committee against Torture, List of issues to be considered during the examination of the
second periodic report of the Philippines, CAT/C/PHL/2 (2009); Cecile Suerte Felipe, Cops
4 [Vol. 20:1
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fair trial"' 3 and, "in the overwhelming majority of jurisdictions, if not quite
all, [the] Miranda rule has become a fundamental legal provision enshrined
in national legislation."' 4
At home Miranda enjoys equal support-at least among the general
public-notwithstanding an initially shaky reception.' 5  As the U.S.
Supreme Court recognized in 2000, "Miranda has become embedded in
routine police practice to the point where the warnings have become part of
our national culture."16 As a result, an overwhelming majority of Americans
are now aware of the protections afforded by the decision' 7 and believe in
getting to Know 'Miranda,' THE PHILIPPINE STAR, Apr. 7, 2008 (explaining Miranda's
holding and noting "Miranda Rights were later adopted in the Bill of Rights of the Philippine
Constitution, with the additional safeguard that these rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel"). See also R. v. Shaw, 57 A Crim. R. 425 (1991) (Court of
Criminal Appeal for Victoria) (attributing certain 1998 amendments to Victoria's Crimes Act
of 1958 to the "intellectual fount" of Miranda).
" Imbrioscia v. Switzerland, 17 Eur. Ct. H.R. 441 (1994) (Dissenting Opinion of J. De
Meyer). See also Galstyan v. Armenia, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) (Partly Dissenting Opinion of
Judge Fura-Sandstrom) (discussing the right to counsel under Miranda and "why it is so
important to uphold"). The Miranda decision has even been summoned by foreign courts to
address governmental overreaching unrelated to interrogation. See, e.g., Kinoti v. Republic,
[2011] eKLR (Kenya); Prosecutor v. Delalic et. al, Case No. IT-96-2 I-T, Decision on the
Prosecution's Oral Requests for the Admission of Exhibit 155 into Evidence and for an order
to Compel the Accused, Zdravko Mucic, to Provide a Handwriting Sample, 49, (Int'l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Jan. 19, 1998).
14 O'Halloran v. United Kingdom, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2007) (Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Pavlovschi). This is true, for example, of Spain, Italy, Canada, France, and Russia. See, e.g.,
Stephen C. Thaman, Miranda in Comparative Law, 45 ST. LouIs L.J. 581 (2001) (noting,
however, that the precise nature of the rights provided vary in each jurisdiction). While these
changes may have been influenced by Miranda, it is important to note that the decision was not
the only, nor even the first domestic measure to address procedural rights related to
interrogation. In fact, two years prior to the Miranda decision, Germany adopted the
requirement that suspects be advised pre-interrogation that they are permitted to say nothing
and have the right to ask questions of a lawyer. Id. at 594 (noting, however, that there was no
right to have the lawyer present during the interrogation). See also Miranda v. Arizona, 384
U.S. 436, (1966) (Harlan, J, dissenting) (noting that, in England, "a caution as to silence but
not counsel ha[d] long been mandated by the 'Judges' Rules,' which also place[d] other
somewhat imprecise limits on police cross-examination of suspects").
's "At the time of the 1966 decision, only 32% of the public believed that the restrictions
on police power laid out by the Court were correct and fair." Amy E. Lerman, The Rights of
the Accused, in PUBLIC OPINION AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY 41, 51 (Nathaniel
Persily, Jack Citrin & Patrick J. Egan, eds., 2008) (citing a 1966 poll). See also Corinna Barrett
Lain, Countermajoritarian Hero or Zero? Rethinking the Warren Court's Role in the Criminal
Procedure Revolution, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1422-4 (citing a series of (admittedly flawed)
polling questions that indicated public approval of Miranda in 1966 was no higher than 65%
and was perhaps as low as 24%). "By 1968, Miranda was undeniably unpopular..." Id. at
1424.
16 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443 (2000).
" "A national poll in 1984 revealed that 93% of those surveyed knew they had a right to
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their importance. Indeed, "the Miranda rule enjoys almost unanimous
popular support in America."' 8
Given this global affection for the seminal opinion, it seems fair to
assume that, having adopted comparable cautions, international criminal
courts stand poised to enhance the esteem in which they are held. Yet this
ought only to be true if the practice of these courts actually and adequately
safeguards the international human rights of their suspects, in particular the
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. As the U.S. experience has
shown, however, such protection cannot be assumed from the availability of
Miranda-like warnings.
Rather, while the 1966 decision continues to serve as a touchstone for
foreign courts and fosters amongst Americans a sense of comfort in their
legal system,19  those more familiar with the Court's developing
jurisprudence have actually begun to mourn Miranda.20 Members of this
group commonly lament the fact that the revered decision has been the
repeated victim of stealth overruling,21 "whittled away slowly, suffering a
an attorney if arrested, and a national poll in 1991 revealed that 80% knew they had a right to
remain silent if arrested." Richard A. Leo, The Impact of Miranda Revisited, 86 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 621, 651 (1996) (internal citation omitted); Jay Evenson, 'Popular Culture'
Won out in Miranda, DESERET NEWS (July 2, 2000), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
769029/Popular-culture-won-out-in-Miranda.html?pg=all (stating that "Miranda has been
repeated so many times... that most Americans can recite it better than the 10
Commandments.").
I" In a nation-wide survey conducted in 2000, 91% of persons polled expressed support
for Miranda warnings. RONALD WEITZER & STEVEN A. TUCH, RACE AND POLICING IN
AMERICA: CONFLICT AND REFORM 144-45 (2006) (finding, in addition, that a majority of
these strongly supported the decision). See also Lerman, supra note 15, at 51-2 (citing a 2000
survey in which 86% of Americans questioned registered their approval of informing suspects
of the right to silence and counsel prior to questioning and noting strong support for Miranda
warnings across racial, political, religious and geographical lines).
'9 See Barry Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling (with Particular Attention to
Miranda v. Arizona), 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 42 (2010) (noting that "the public supports Miranda and
appears to believe it is alive and well").
20 Charles D. Weisselberg, Mourning Miranda, 96 CAL. L. REV. 1519, 1521 (2008)
(concluding that the Supreme Court's gutting of Miranda's safeguards has rendered the
decision's protective value "largely dead").
21 "[Berghuis v. Thompkins] is but one of a series of high court rulings in recent months
that have effectively nipped away at the infamous Miranda ruling... Perhaps because it is
occurring incrementally, few outside the legal community have taken note of the trend." Mary
Sanchez, Supreme Court Diverges on Miranda, KAN. CITY STAR, Jun. 4, 2010 (confirming the
popular perception of Miranda in part by praising Justice Sotomayor's refusal to endorse it
incursion by noting "America, she's got your back."). See also Christopher J. Peters, Under
the Table Overruling, 54 WAYNE L. REV. 1067, 1090 (2008) (noting that most non-lawyers
learn about Supreme Court decisions through the media and that the latter are unlikely to
report that constitutional precedent had been overruled unless the Court expressly
acknowledges having done so).
6 [Vol. 20:1
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death by many cuts" 22 at the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court. As the
following sections demonstrate, this persistent narrowing of Miranda both
inhibits the aim of the decision in the United States while simultaneously
rendering international criminal justice more rights-protective by
comparison.
III. THE MIRANDA DECISION
Although a controversial decision from its inception23 to the present
24day, there is ample evidence that Chief Justice Warren's aim in penning
Miranda was a noble one.25 As the Court would later expressly
acknowledge, the decision sought to "dissipate 'the overbearin
compulsion. . .caused by isolation of a suspect in police custody."'
Accordingly, the Miranda Court set its focus on the "incommunicado
interrogation of individuals in a police dominated atmosphere," 27 producing
an opinion that necessarily lays bare an embarrassing array of U.S. law
28
enforcement conduct employed to induce confessions. The decision is also
replete with language that makes it an attractive source for the development
of international human rights law.29 In support of the warnings it requires,
22 Friedman, supra note 19, at 36.
23 In the immediate aftermath of the 5-4 opinion, "some critics of the decision [were]
sufficiently upset to recommend a constitutional amendment reversing [it]."Michael Wald,
Richard Ayres, David W. Hess, Mark Shantz & Charles H. Whitebread, II, Interrogations in
New Haven: The Impact of Miranda, 76 YALE L.J. 1519, 1521 (1967).
24 "The words of the Fifth Amendment command that "No person ... shall be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' Nowhere is there any reference to a
warnings and waiver regime, and never has any member of the Supreme Court.... actually said
that the Constitution so commands." Ronald J. Allen, The Misguided Defenses of Miranda v.
Arizona, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 205, 206 (2007) (averring that "[n]o plausible theory of
constitutional interpretation... allows one to reach the conclusion the Court did") (internal
citations omitted).
25 "There seems to be general agreement among Warren's biographers that, as a result of
his experiences as a prosecuting attorney, the feature of the criminal justice system that
aroused his strongest emotions was the confession obtained during police custody." Yale
Kamisar, On the Fortieth Anniversary of the Miranda Case: Why We Needed It, How We Got
It-And What Happened to It, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 163, 175 (2007).
26 Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 340 (1984) (quoting United States v. Washington,
431 U.S. 181, 187, n.5 (1977)).
27 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 445 (1966).
28 From the "positive" identification of suspects in contrived line-ups to the provision of
false legal advice, the decision directly admits to the ploys, patently unbefitting an enlightened
system of justice, designed to obtain confessions by psychological coercion. See generally id.
at 450-54.
29 See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Harmonic Convergence? Constitutional Criminal
Procedure in an International Context, 75 IND. L.J. 809, 828, n. 116 (2000) (noting that in the
case law of the European Court of Human Rights the Miranda opinion is used to argue for
72013]
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the Miranda opinion exalts the significance of human dignity and integrity,30
the imperatives of an accusatory system of justice,31 and the importance of
procedural equality.32 It also provides valuable support for the notion that
pre-trial protective measures may be an indispensable prerequisite for
preserving trial rights such as, in its own case, the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination.33
In substance, the Miranda holding requires the automatic exclusion of
any statement produced by "custodial interrogation," unless the government
can establish "the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the
privilege against self-incrimination." 34 These safeguards include informing
the suspect, prior to questioning that he has the right to remain silent and to
have the presence of counsel-appointed if necessary-before and during
questioning.35 In addition, the suspect must be made aware of the
consequences of choosing to speak, by being provided with an "explanation
that anything said can and will be used against the individual in court."36
Only when a suspect voluntarily waives effectuation of these rights in a
knowing and intelligent fashion will subsequent answers be rendered
admissible.37
more expansive suspect rights).
3o In so doing, the majority identifies nemo tenetur as among "the most cherished
principles" in the United States and notes its "intimate connection" with custodial
interrogation. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
" "[O]ur accusatory system of justice demands that the government seeking to punish an
individual produce the evidence against him by its own independent labor, rather than by the
cruel expedient of compelling it from his own mouth." Id. at 460.
32 "The accused who does not know of his rights may be the person who most needs
counsel." Id at 470-71 (proceeding to quote favorably from a California Supreme Court
opinion rejecting favorable treatment for defendants owing to "sophistication or status").
11 Id. at 467 (noting that "there can be no doubt that the Fifth Amendment privilege is
available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect persons in all settings in
which their freedom of action is compelled in any significant way from being compelled to
incriminate themselves"). "Without the protections flowing from adequate warning and the
rights of counsel, 'all the careful safeguards erected around the giving of testimony.. would
become empty formalities in a procedure where the most compelling evidence of guilt, a
confession, would have been already obtained at the unsupervised pleasure of the police."' Id.
at 466 (citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting)).
34 Id at 444.
3 Id
36 Id at 469.
37 Id. at 444-45.
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IV. INTERROGATION PROTECTIONS AT CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURTS
A. The ICTY, ICTR and the SCSL's Shared Approach
The Miranda warnings bear a distinct resemblance to the procedural
safeguards later codified for international criminal suspects at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and then
replicated at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda 39 (ICTR) and
the Special Court for Sierra Leone40 (SCSL). The shared approach of these
three courts includes a statutory right for a questioned suspect "to be assisted
by counsel of his own choice, including the right to have legal assistance
assigned to him without payment by him in any such case if he does not
have sufficient means to pay for it."Al This protection was then
supplemented and explicated by Rule 42,42 a provision "largely based" on
the "Miranda requirement." 43
Rule 42 provides that before a suspect can be questioned he must be
* Established under the Statute of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in
the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex (1993)
[hereinafter ICTY Statute].
39 Established under the Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N.
Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
40 Agreement between the United Nations and the Government of Sierra Leone on the
Establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone (Jan. 16, 2002), UN Doc. S/2000/915,
annex (2000) [hereinafter SCSL Statute].
41 ICTY Statute, supra note 38, at Art. 18(3) (providing in addition the right to necessary
translations into a language that the suspect speaks and understands).
42 International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former
Yugoslavia Since 1991: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, [hereinafter ICTY RPE], R. 42;
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Rules of Procedure and Evidence, entered into
force 29 June 1995, R. 42, UN Doc. ITR/3/Rev. l (1995) [hereinafter ICTR RPE]. The ICTR
adopted, mutatis mutandis, the ICTY's Rules of Procedure and Evidence. ICTR Statute, supra
note 39, at art. 14. By and large, the ICTR also opted to adopt the later changes that the ICTY
made to its RPE. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bagosora, et. al, Case No. ICTR-97-7-T , Decision
on Defence Motion for Pre-Determination of Rules of Evidence, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia July 8, 1998) (describing the ICTR RPE as a "replica" of the ICTY's
Rules); Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, R.42, (2002).)
[hereinafter SCSL RPE]. By virtue of its statute, the SCSL inherited, mutatis mutandis, the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICTR. SCSL Statute, supra note 40, at art. 14(1).
43 VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF, I AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 199, n.540 (1995). See
also Prosecutor's Office of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Trbic, Case No.: X-KRZ-07/386,
Second Instance Verdict, 131, (Ct. of Bosn. & Herz. Oct. 21, 2010) (noting that Miranda
warnings "are similar to those required by the ICTY").
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informed of the right to be assisted by counsel, appointed if necessary, and
of the right to remain silent, including a caution that any statement made
may be used in evidence.44 The Rule further dictates that suspect questioning
"shall not proceed without the presence of counsel unless the suspect has
voluntarily waived the right to counsel" and that, if a suspect who waives the
right to have counsel present later changes his mind on the issue,
"questioning shall thereupon cease, and shall only resume when the suspect
has obtained or has been assigned counsel."45 Failure to comply with these
procedural safeguards may result in the exclusion of the suspect's statements
at trial.46
B. The International Criminal Court
In similar fashion, the Rome Statute of the ICC ("Rome Statute")
provides that "where there are grounds to believe that a person has
committed a crime within the jurisdiction of the Court," that person may not
be questioned until he or she is informed of the right to remain silent. In
addition, the person must be informed of his right to have the legal
assistance of counsel, assigned if needed, 48 and to be questioned in the
presence of counsel.49 While the ICC statutory provision does not have a
parallel for the Miranda requirement that suspects be warned of the negative
consequences of waiver, it instead requires that suspects are provided with
important information not found in Miranda's warnings: that the decision to
remain silent cannot be considered in determining guilt.50 As under the
4 R. 42(A)(i) and (iii)., ICTY RPE, supra note 42.
45 ICTY R. 42(B), ICTY RPE, supra note 42.
46 Although this remedy is not automatic, improperly obtained statements have been
consistently excluded. See infra notes 196 et. seq. and accompanying text. For a general
discussion of the rule governing the exclusion of evidence under the shared approach, see
notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
47 Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art 55(2)(b).
48 Id at art. 55(2)(c).
49 Id at art. 55(2)(d). The sub-article also requires that the person be informed that there
are grounds to believe that he has committed a crime within the Court's jurisdiction. Id. at art.
55(2)(a).
so Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art 55(2)(b). On the need for such a warning in the
United States, see e.g. Mark A. Godsey, Reformulating the Miranda Warnings in Light of
Contemporary Law & Understandings, 90 Minn. L. Rev. 718, 783, 793 (2006). See also:
Geoffrey S. Corn, The Missing Miranda Warning: Why What You Don't Know Really Can
Hurt You, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 761, 762 (2011) (arguing that "[t]his 'missing' Miranda
warning is essential to enable a suspect confronted with custodial interrogation to
meaningfully exercise the privilege against self-incrimination."). These contemporary
observations map on to concerns raised in the immediate wake of the Miranda decision. See,
e.g., Sheldon H. Elsen & Arthur Rosett, Protections for the Suspect, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 645,
654 (1967).
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shared ap roach, non-compliance with these safeguards may result in
exclusion.
V. THE MIRANDA COMPARISON
It is little wonder that Rule 42 has been recognized as having
"transposed 'Miranda' into international criminal law." 2 Likewise, it is
plain to see wh' it is that ICC suspects53 are frequently said to enjoy
"Miranda rights" 4 and that their statutory safeguards are "Miranda-esque.
At the same time, there are some notable differences. First, the approach of
these international courts appears to provide less protection than the
Miranda decision in that there is no requirement that questioning cease upon
56
a suspect's decision to avail of his right to silence. Rather, the international
5 While the ICC has yet to deal with such a situation, it has somewhat analogously
addressed-and rejected-the admissibility of statements obtained independently from the
Court under rather troubling conditions. Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-
01/07-04, Decision on Prosecutor's Bar Table Motion, 63, (Dec. 17, 2010). For a general
discussion of the ICC's statutory provision on the exclusion of evidence, see infra notes 176-
181 and accompanying text.
52 ALEXANDER ZAHAR & GORAN SLUITER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 304 (2007).
s For ease of reference, this article will use the term "suspect" to denote individuals who
fall within the ambit of Article 55(2), despite the fact that the term does not appear in the ICC
Statute. In part, this absence can be attributed to the fact that no agreement could be reached
regarding a definition for the term. Hakan Friman, Rights of Persons Suspected or Accused of
a Crime, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE,
ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS AND RESULTS , 247, 248 (Roy S. Lee, ed., 1999). In addition, there
were concerns that the use of the term might be seen as undermining the presumption of
innocence. Christopher Keith Hall, 'Article 55' COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 1089, 1097 (Otto Triffterer, ed., 1999) (noting the
"resulting awkwardness" of the term's omission).
5 See, e.g., Aaron Fichtelberg, Democratic Legitimacy and the International Criminal
Court, A Liberal Defence, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 765, 779 (2006); AM. SOC'Y INT'L L., U.S.
Policy Toward the International Criminal Court: Furthering Positive Engagement, 43, Mar.
2009; David Scheffer & Ashley Cox, The Constitutionality of the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 983, 1010, 1055 (2008);
Mandiaye Niang, The Senegalese Legal Framework for the Prosecution of International
Crimes, 7 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1047, 1061 (2009).
s Douglas E. Edlin, The Anxiety of Sovereignty: Britain, The United States and The
International Criminal Court, 29 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 8 (2006); see also M. Cherif
Bassiouni, Court Is No Threat to Us, CH. TRIB., July 14, 2002, at I (noting that the ICC
Statute requires a "Miranda-type warning").
56 "From the language of both the Statute and the rules it seems to be a fait accompli that
the suspect must submit to the questioning process by the prosecutor." Daniel D. Ntanda
Nsereko, Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia, 5 CRIM. L.F. 507, 524 (1994).
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criminal suspect has "a right to remain silent during interrogation."57
Indeed, international case law makes clear that the prosecution need not
inform suspects that they have the right to terminate the interrogation58 and,
in practice, some persons questioned have opted to answer some questions
and not others.
At the same time, the shared approach and the protections afforded by
the ICC Statute sweep more broadly than Miranda: every international
criminal suspect is entitled to receive the requisite cautions prior to official
questioning. As a result, these international protections are inconsistent with
the seminal opinion in a seemingly striking way, as Miranda warnings are
required only in cases of "custodial interrogation."60 The following section
considers the breadth of this divergence.
A. The Custody Distinction
Remarkably, the Warren Court's decision to limit the required warnings
to custodial situations is not attributable to an effort to limit Miranda's
" K. de Meester, K. Pitcher, R. Rastan & G. Sluiter, Investigation, Coercive Measures,
Arrest and Surrender, 171, 252 in INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: PRINCIPLES AND
RULES (2013). While this "right to remain silent during interrogation" seems a markedly
different model from the right to silence enjoyed by U.S. suspects, the 2010 decision of
Berghuis v. Thompkins noticeably narrows the gap between the two approaches. In that case, a
majority of the Court held that "after giving a Miranda warning, police may interrogate a
suspect who has neither invoked nor waived his or her Miranda rights." Berghuis v.
Thompkins 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2264 (2010) (remarking, at 2254, that "had [the interrogated
suspect] wanted to remain silent, he could have said nothing in response or unambiguously
invoked his Miranda rights, ending the interrogation"). As a result, a U.S. suspect "must utter
magic words" to transform the right "to remain silent while interrogation takes place" into the
right "to avoid interrogation altogether." Sherry F. Colb, The Supreme Court Holds That
Responding to Police Interrogation Waives The Right to Remain Silent, FindLaw,com (June 7,
2010) http://writ.news.findlaw.com/colb/20100607.html. A more detailed discussion of the
Thompkins case appears infra at notes 147 et. seq. and accompanying text
5 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Popovic et. al, Case No. IT-04-88-T, Decision on the
Admissibility of the Boravcanin Interview and the Amendment of the Rule 65 ter Exhibit List,
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 25, 2007) (concluding that Rule 42 does not
require the prosecutor's investigator to inform a suspect that he is "at liberty to leave the
interview or not required to speak 'at all').
" See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Haradinaj et. al, Case No. IT-04-84-PT , Decision on Lahi
Brahimaj's Motion for Provisional Release, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov.
3, 2005) (considering the accused's cooperation during a voluntary interview, while noting that
"he remained silent to questions touching upon areas outside his own criminal responsibility").
Although the questioning of an ICTY accused is covered by a separate rule, Rule 63, that rule
requires compliance with the cautions in Rule 42. ICTY RPE, supra note 42, at R. 63(B).
I The Court defines this term as "questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after
a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any
significant way." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
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application.6 1 Rather, the custodial aspect of police questioning was essential
to the Court's conclusion that warnings ought to be required in the first
place. Searching through then-contemporary interrogation manuals, the
Miranda Court identified ways in which the interrogation environment was
manipulated so as to compel suspects to speak. Highlighting law
enforcement efforts designed to isolate the suspect62 and to obtain the
advantage of an unfamiliar atmosphere,63 so as to "subjugate the individual
to the will of his examiner,"64 the Court concluded that there is "compulsion
inherent in custodial surroundings."65
At the same time, and in keeping with its theme of enlightened justice,
the decision was arguably more generous than these observations required.
Perhaps motivated by its determination that the US system of criminal
justice ought, at a minimum, to be as rights-protective as the other
66jurisdictions whose interrogation practices it surveyed, the Court
concluded that its warnings are required before interrogation of a person in
custod "or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant
way.
This initial description of custody could suggest that the divide between
the applicability of Miranda and its international counterparts might not be
all that severe. The Court's broad definition of custody "arguably casts a
wide net with respect to the number and types of circumstances to which the
6 The limitation is, however, the subject of both criticism and law enforcement gaming.
As to the former, see Rinat Kitai-Sangero, Respecting the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination: A Call for Providing Miranda Warnings in Non-Custodial Interrogations, 42
N.M.L. REV. 203 (2012). For an example of the latter, see United States v. Slaight, 620 F.3d
816, 817 (2010) (concluding that the officers in the case attempted to disguise a custodial
situation as non-custodial in order to circumvent Miranda).
62 "To be alone with the subject is essential..." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 455.
63 Id. at 457.
6 Id
65 Id at 458. "An individual swept from familiar surroundings into police custody,
surrounded by antagonistic forces, and subjected to the techniques described above cannot be
otherwise than under compulsion to speak."Id. at 461.
66 "[I]t is consistent with our legal system that we give at least as much protection to
these rights as is given in the jurisdictions described." Id at 489. The Miranda decision
considered the interrogation safeguards employed in England, Scotland, India and Ceylon, as
well as the practices employed by the FBI and required by the Uniform Code of Military
Justice. Id. at 484-89. "[U]nder these other systems of criminal justice, warnings were
typically given or required for 'both suspects and persons under arrest"' Leslie A. Lunney, The
Erosion of Miranda: Stare Decisis Consequences, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 727, 754 (1999)
(quoting a letter tendered by the US Solicitor General regarding FBI warning practices and
noting the "Miranda Court intended its warning requirement to be at least as protective as [the
countries whose practices it considered]").
67 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444.
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decision applies,"68 as appears to be reflected in the Court's early
jurisprudence on the subject. Indeed, two years after Miranda was decided, a
majority of the Court rejected the argument that its warnings are required
only when the person being questioned is in custody because of the case
under investigation.69 The following year, the Supreme Court found
Miranda custody when a suspect was questioned in his bedroom. 70 The
Court as it was then constituted recognized narrowing the definition of
custody as "contrary to the whole purpose of the Miranda decision," to wit:
providing "meaningful protection" to the constitutional privilege against
compelled self-incrimination. 71
Over time, however, and particularly due to subsequent changes to the
composition of the Court, a reorientation of the Miranda custody analysis
came about that "em hasize[d] the formality of arrest as the determinative
'in custody' issue."T By 1983, although the Court continued to pay lip
service to Miranda's freedom of action language73 it had all but eliminated
its import, redefining custody for Miranda purposes to situations where
"there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree
associated with a formal arrest." 74
68 Daniel R. Dinger, Is there a Seat for Miranda at Terry's Table? An Analysis of the
Federal Circuit Split Over the Need for Miranda Warnings During Coercive Terry Detentions,
36 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1467, 1610 (2010) (noting how the Court narrowed the definition
of Miranda custody to allow for Miranda-free questioning of temporarily detained persons).
69 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968). See also Thomas R. Harkness, When an
Accused is not Free to Leave, Failure by the Police to Advise Him of His Miranda Rights Prior
to Interrogation Violates the Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Orozco v.
Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), 48 TEX. L. REV. 955, 957 n.21 (1970) (attributing the conclusion
that the suspect was in custody to an officer's testimony that, in his opinion, the suspect was
not free to leave once his identity had been established).
7o Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324, 326-27 (1969).
" Mathis, 391 U.S. at 4.
72 Lunney, supra note 66, at 758. Lunney marks the 1976 decision in Beckwith v. United
States as the turning point in this regard. Id. In Beckwith, Justice Brennan-then the sole
remaining member of the Miranda majority on the Court-dissented from the majority's
finding that the suspect was not in custody for Miranda purposes, emphasizing that formal
custody is not a prerequisite for Miranda warnings. Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341,
349 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7 California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1123 (1983) (availing of the language in finding
that at the time of his questioning Beheler was not significantly deprived of his freedom of
action).
74 Id. at 1125. See also Katherine M. Swift, Drawing a Line between Terry & Miranda:
The Degree and Duration ofRestraint, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 1075, 1079 (2006) (concluding that
the Beheler custody test is narrower than the one set out in Miranda). This revised definition
effectively sanctions Miranda-less questioning during most investigatory and traffic stops,
although such stops may significantly curtail the freedom of action of their subjects and are
"inherently somewhat coercive." United States v. Streifel, 781 F.2d 953, 958 (1st Cir.1986),
quoting United States v. Bautista, 684 F.2d 1286, 1291 (9th Cir.1982). "In a sense, then, the
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1. Contemporary Miranda Custody
This revised and ungenerous approach to Miranda custody has made it
possible for warning-less and coercive interrogations to pass constitutional
muster75 even when conducted at a police station while employing
techniques specifically decried by the Miranda decision.76 In effect, the
Court's narrow construction of Miranda custody has engendered decisions
that "suggest a particular tactic to officers"7  who are eager to avoid
providing the warnings, yet invested in obtaining admissible statements.
Sometimes referred to as "Beheler admonitions," this approach entails
telling a suspect that he is not under arrest, regardless of the truth of the
statement, and even when remaining objective factors not only indicate
otherwise but tend to render the encounter coercive.79
To appreciate just how far afield these developments in "Miranda
custody" bring current U.S. doctrine from the 1966 decision-and from the
[revised Miranda custody] test has narrowed so that detentions such as Terry stops can
lawfully take place without the need for Miranda warnings." Dinger, supra note 68, at 1610.
7 See, e.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (concluding that "a
noncustodial situation is not converted to one in which Miranda applies simply because a
reviewing court concludes that, even in the absence of any formal arrest or restraint on
freedom of movement, the questioning took place in a "coercive environment').
76 1 JOSHUA DRESSLER & ALAN C. MICHAELS, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§24.07(B)(5) (5th ed. 2010) (discussing Mathiason, a case in which a parolee, interrogated
upon complying with a request to appear at the police station, was falsely told that his
fingerprints had been found at the scene of crime). Despite the state court's conclusion that
this falsehood contributed to a coercive interrogation environment, the Supreme Court, per
curiam, found that the lie "ha[d] nothing to do with whether respondent was in custody for
purposes of the Miranda rule." Mathiason, 429 U.S at 496.
n Weisselberg, supra note 20, at 1541. See also Richard A. Leo, Questioning the
Relevance of Miranda in the Twenty-First Century, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1000, 1017 (2001)
(discussing the same law enforcement strategy).
* In California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121 (1983), the Court concluded that a suspect who
voluntarily accompanied the police to the stationhouse for questioning, after being told he was
not under arrest, was not in custody for the purposes of Miranda.
71 This practice has proven so successful that some jurisdictions specifically train officers
to inform their to-be-questioned detainees that they are not under arrest, irrespective of the
truth of the statement. Interrogation Law 2003, POST Telecourse Reference Guide, Aug. 2003,
at Appendix E: Beheler Admonishment, available at http://www.post.ca.gov/Data/Sites/l/
post docs/telecoursereferenceguides/Interrogation%2OLaw%202003.pdf See also KAREN M.
HESS, CHRISTINE H. ORTHMANN & HENRY LIM CHO, POLICE OPERATIONS: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 60 (2010) (noting that Miranda can be avoided by using a so-called "Beheler
admonition, telling the suspect, 'You're not under arrest. You're free to leave anytime you
want, ok?"'). For stationhouse interrogations, which present a predictably greater challenge to
a finding of non-custody, a slightly different tactic is suggested: "tell[ing] the suspect in a
believable way [that he is] free to leave or not answer any questions at any time."'
Interrogation Law 2003, supra note 79, at Appendix E (emphasis in original) (concluding
"Then you may proceed with interrogation without the need for Miranda warnings").
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protections enjoyed by questioned international criminal suspects-consider
the 2012 case of jail inmate Randall Fields.80 While serving a 45 day jail
sentence for disorderly conduct, Fields was removed from his cell one
evening by a corrections officer and two sheriffs deputies, without being
told where he was being taken or for what purpose.8 ' He was then brought
through a door that divides the jail from the sheriff s department and placed
in a stationhouse conference room. 82 There Fields was interrogated at length
83by two armed guards about his conduct outside of the jail. The
interrogating officers did not inform Fields of his Miranda rights, but did
provide him with a Beheler admonition, informing Fields "that if he did not
want to cooperate he was free to leave the room at any time." 84 Despite the
fact that Fields told the officers numerous times that he did not want to
speak with them anymore, the interrogation proceeded into the early
morning.5  Subjected to between 5 and 7 hours of apparently hostile
questioning and deprived during that time of his daily-prescribed, vital
86 8medication, Fields eventually confessed.87
In finding that Fields was not in custody for Miranda purposes, and
therefore not entitled to Miranda warnings, the Fields majority illustrates
how law enforcement can utilize Beheler admonitions to successfully affect
the subsequent custody analysis, in this case by informing Fields that he was
free to leave the room. Perhaps more importantly, the Fields decision
8 Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181, 182 L. Ed. 2d 17 (2012).
" Fields v. Howes, 617 F.3d 813, 815 (2010).
82 "Fields had to pass through the 'J door,' which is the door that divides the jail from the
Sheriffs Department." Id at 827, n.3 (McKeague, J., concurring).
83 Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. at 1186.
84 Fields v. Howes, 617 F.3d at 815 (noting, however, that due to the jail setting, it would
have taken nearly twenty minutes for Fields to depart the conference room).
8s Id. (approximating that the interrogation lasted seven hours).
8 Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. at 1195 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (explaining that Fields, a
kidney transplant recipient, was required to take two anti-rejection medications).
Idat 1186.
Id at 1193 (citing the fact that Fields was informed that he could leave the room as the
"most important" objective factor that weighed against a finding of custody). Remarkably, the
issue of custody was not necessary to decide the case, which could have been resolved by
merely reversing the Sixth Circuit's grant of habeas corpus. All the Court's members agreed
that Fields was not entitled to habeas relief, because existing law on custody was not "clearly
established" in Fields' favor, as required by applicable law. Id. at 1188-89, 1194 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). This result would certainly have been preferable to a decision that undoubtedly
will further incentivize law enforcement to conduct incommunicado interrogations of non-
Mirandized prisoners after informing them that they may return to their cells if they wish-
something this author would deem an "error cost" of the decision. "Good judges try to
minimize the sum of .... error costs." Cass Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, I 10 HARV. L.
REv. 6, 16 (1996) (explaining, at 18, that "error costs are the costs of mistaken judgments as
they affect the social and legal systems as a whole").
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demonstrates how utterly faithless the current doctrine on Miranda custody
is to the original opinion, There can be little doubt that the Miranda majority
would have found that circumstances attendant to Fields' interrogation fell
within its expansive definition of custody..
In fact, the five members of the seminal majority opinion (tacitly) found
Miranda custody under analogous yet less compelling facts in the 1968 case
of Mathis v. United States.89 In Mathis, a suspect was twice subjected to
warning-less interrogations while serving an unrelated prison sentence.
Citing to the Miranda opinion's broad language regarding custody, the
Mathis court concluded that a "person so held must be given his warnings
about his right to be silent and his right to have a lawyer."0 Accordingly, the
Court found that it was error to admit the self-incriminating evidence
obtained in the absence of the requisite warnings.91
In reaching this conclusion, the original Miranda members explicitly
rejected the argument that Miranda warnings are required only when the
person questioned is in custody in relation to the matter under
investigation.92 At the same time, they implicitly found that Mathis was in
custody for the purposes of Miranda,93 even without any indication in the
record that Mathis had been subjected to any form of coercion. 94 Rather
plainly, this was an essential pre-requisite to their determination that the
seminal decision required a reversal of Mathis's conviction.95 Apparently
then, the members of the Miranda majority interpreted that decision's "clear
and unequivocal" language safeguarding the person "taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom by the authorities in any significant
89 Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. 1, 4 (1968).
90 Id. at 5.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 4-5. Mathis was interrogated by a federal Internal Revenue agent while serving a
state prison sentence. Id at 2.
93 Cf Howes v. Fields, 132 S. Ct. 1181,1188 (2012) (arguing that the holding in Mathis is
quite limited).
9 The Fields majority would later maintain that "it is impossible to tell .... whether
[Mathis'] interview was routine or whether there were special features that may have created
an especially coercive atmosphere." Id. at 1188, n.4. As Justice White noted in Mathis,
however: "Neither the record nor the Court suggests reasons why [Mathis] was 'coerced'...."
Mathis v. United States, 391 U.S. at 7 (White, J., dissenting). Moreover, counsel for Mathis
acknowledged in oral argument that coercive methods had not been used against his client.
Instead, counsel simply pointed to the fact that custodial status makes unwitnessed, coercive
methods possible. Oral Argument at 9:48-10:07. Mathis v. United States. 391 U.S. I (No.
726), available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/1 960-1969/1967/1967 726 (audio only).
9s The Mathis Court "granted certiorari to decide whether the Miranda case calls for
reversal." Mathis, 391 U.S. at 3. Its inquiry, therefore, was not restricted to the factors upon
which the intermediate court relied, as the Fields majority would later allege. Howes v. Fields,
132 S. Ct. 1188.
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way"96 to mean that "that prisoners are per se in custody." 97
2. Summary
In sum, as the Fields case demonstrates, modem decisions employ a
narrower assessment of what qualifies as "Miranda custody," relegating
Miranda's actual definition of the term to dissenting opinions,9  and
bringing about results that are at odds with the seminal decision. Indeed,
under the current doctrine, categorical exceptions to Miranda custody appear
to have now become feasible.99 Perhaps most strikingly, as Justice Ginsburg
points out, the current approach to Miranda custody enables courts to
sanction warning-less questioning despite the presence of the key attributes
that gave rise to Miranda's command: incommunicado interrogation of a
suspect, placed against his will and with his freedom sipificantly curtailed,
in an inherently stressful, police-dominated atmosphere. o
By contrast, the international practice of cautioning all suspects
regardless of their custodial status-although a decidedly broader
application than the Miranda decision requires for its safeguards-is
actually more in line with the aim and tenor of the Miranda decision. The
international approach precludes the possibility that the types of warning-
less interrogations that so troubled the Miranda Court might somehow pass
procedural muster.
What is more, the sweeping applicability of the protections afforded to
questioned suspects by international criminal courts better comports with the
equal protection basis of the Miranda decision 01 than current US practice.
This is because the existing emphasis placed by U.S. courts on Beheler
admonitions renders contemporary custody determinations an arbitrary
exercise at best. After a suspect has been informed that the police would like
to question him, but that he is free to leave, the suspect either has to know,
or guess correctly, that the appropriate response is to request to leave the
place of interrogation. Expressing, as Fields did, the wish to not be
interrogated at all-a statement that is sufficient to bring questioning to an
end once Miranda warnings have been given 02-iS seemingly irrelevant to
96 Mathis, 391 U.S. at 5 (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (1966)).
9 Kitai-Sangero, supra note 61, at 205.
98 See, e.g., Howes, 132 S. Ct. at 1194 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
9 "Today, for people already in prison, the Court finds it adequate for the police to say:
'You are free to terminate this interrogation and return to your cell."' Id.
' Id
101 See, e.g., Henry J. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: A Case for
Constitutional Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REV. 671, 711 (1968) (describing equal protection as "a
ground bass that resounds throughout the Miranda opinion").
102 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 473-74.
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the custody question. 0 3
In effect, the now crabbed definition of Miranda custody, and the
consequent mechanisms used by law enforcement to avoid findings of it,
tends to render the very persons the Miranda Court sought to safeguard
protection-less.1 04 As a result, the international approach of providing
warnings to all questioned suspects, regardless of custodial status, is not
only more rights-protective than current U.S. practice, but is a process that is
better poised to further Miranda's goal of insuring that the privilege against
compelled self-incrimination is meaningfully protected across the board.
Turning now to the issues of invocation and waiver, this phenomenon of
greater fidelity to the Miranda decision on the international level appears yet
again, and even more strikingly.
B. Invocation and Waiver
The Miranda Court took a liberal approach in its discussion regarding
rights invocation, holding that an interrogation must cease whenever a
suspect indicates "in any manner, at any stage of the process" either the
desire to consult with a lawyer'o0 or the wish to remain silent. 106Addressing
the other side of the invocation coin-waiver-the Court again evidenced a
commitment to making the warnings it required meaningful. Allocating the
"heavy burden" of establishing waiver to the government, the opinion notes
that "a valid waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the
accused after warnings are given or simply from the fact that a confession
was in fact eventually obtained."'o07 Rather, the decision proclaims that "[n]o
effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be
recognized unless specifically made after the warnings have been given."'
0 8
103 The Fields majority only once acknowledged Fields' contention that "he said several
times during the interview that he no longer wanted to talk to the deputies." Howes v. Fields,
132 S. Ct. atl 186. No reference was made to this aspect of the interrogation encounter when
the majority later identified the factors that "lend some support to [the] argument that
Miranda 's custody requirement was met." Id at 1192-93 .
1" "The accused who does not know his rights and therefore does not make a request may
be the person who most needs counsel." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470-71 (rejecting a procedural
paradigm that provides varying levels of protection based upon sophistication or status).
1os Id. at 444-45.
106 Id. at 473-74.
107 Id. at 475.
10 Id. at 470. See also id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (observing that "[t]o forgo these
rights, some affirmative statement of rejection is seemingly required"). Justice Brennan, a
member of the five-justice Miranda majority has likewise interpreted the quoted language to
require affirmative waiver. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 377 (1979) (Brennan, J,
dissenting).
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1. The Standard of Proof for Effective Waiver
a. The Miranda doctrine
In arriving at the conclusion that the government ought to bear a "heavy
burden" if it is to establish that a custodial suspect waived the protections set
out in Miranda's warnings, the Court noted that it "has always set high
standards of proof for the waiver of constitutional rights." 09 Similarly, as a
member of the Miranda majority would later explain, the decision to
characterize the state's burden as heavy was '[i]n recognition of the
importance of the Due Process Clause and the Fifth Amendment."' Later
decisions, at least ostensibly, adhered to the Miranda standard, describing
the government's burden as either "great" 'II or "heavy"1 l2 and concluding
that "courts must presume that a defendant did not waive his rights."l 3
As descriptors like "great" and "heavy" are not traditional standards of
proof, however, one must consider the effect of these words upon the
customary benchmarks employed in American law. In the U.S. system, the
standard of proof spectrum ranges from preponderance of evidence as the
least exacting to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the most rigorous, with
clear and convincing evidence as an intermediate standard."14 With these
three options in mind, the Miranda court's "heavy burden" language
logically requires, at a minimum, that the government establish waiver by
clear and convincing evidence.1 15
Yet again, however, the evolution of the so-called Miranda doctrine led
to a standard contrary to that indicated by its parent opinion. Despite the
compelling reasoning that Miranda's heavy burden language signified an
intention to impose a rigorous standard of proof for waiver, the Court
ultimately adopted a standard that is anything but exacting. Disingenuously
dismissing Miranda's heavy burden language as a comment made "in
passing," 6 a majority of the Court held in the 1986 decision of Colorado v.
1o9 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
110 Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 185 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
112 Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724 (1979) (concluding, at 725, that this burden
required courts to consider whether, based upon the totality of the circumstances, "the accused
in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to forgo his rights...
Butler, 441 U.S. at 373.
114 JULIANE KOKOTT, THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 19-20 (1998).
"I Mark Berger, Compromise and Continuity: Miranda Waivers, Confession
Admissibility, and the Retention of Interrogation Protections, 49 U. PITT. L. REV. 1007, 1024
(1988) (noting that the preponderance standard, as "the lightest burden persuasion among the
available choices," is inapposite to the "heavy burden" language).
116 Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167.
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Connelly that "the State need prove waiver only by a preponderance of the
evidence."" 7
Justice Brennan-who formed part of the Miranda majority in 1966-
"emphatically dissent[ed]" in Connelly. Brennan maintained that the
decision to impose the preponderance standard "ignores the explicit
command of Miranda."' 18 In Brennan's view, even an intermediate standard
would have fallen short of Miranda 's intended "heavy burden." Brennan
rather contended that "[t]he constitutional ideal that involuntary confessions
should never be admitted against the defendant in criminal cases deserves
protection by the highest standard of proof-proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."" 9 Remarkably, this is precisely the standard that international
prosecutors have been required to meet in order to establish waiver.
b. The Shared Approach
The shared statutory and procedural approach to suspect interrogations
at the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL, unlike the Miranda decision's "heavy
burden" language, provides no descriptors regarding the requisite standard
of proof for either establishing waiver of the right to counsel or the voluntary
nature of suspect statements. The ICTY's Celebici Trial Chamber appears to
have been the first to confront either question when, in 1997, it considered
the admissibility of a statement made by then-suspect Zdravko Mucic to
members of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). Noting that the statements
must be reliable in order to be admitted, 12 the Chamber concluded that the
OTP, as the proponent of the statements, bore the burden of establishing
beyond a reasonable doubt that they had been voluntarily made.121
"' Id. at 168.
"' Id at 184 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In addition, Brennan criticized the Connelly
majority for even considering the standard of proof issue, as it had not been raised in the
government's petition. Id. at 183-84. For this reason, Justice Blackmun did not join the
majority opinion, opting instead to file an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment. Id. at 171. In effect, the Connelly court decided, sua sponte, that despite Miranda's
heavy burden language, the requisite standard should be "the weakest possible burden of proof
for waiver." Id at 185.
"' Connelly, 479 U.S. at 186.
120 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic's Motion for
the Exclusion of Evidence, T 41, (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 2, 1997).
The Trial Chamber was applying the ICTY's exclusionary rule, which provides that evidence
is inadmissible "if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on its reliability or if its
admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the proceedings."
ICTY RPE, supra note 42, at R. 95. The ICTY's exclusionary rule is discussed in greater detail
infra at note 172 and accompanying text.
121 Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic's Motion for the Exclusion
of Evidence, at 42. OTP later accepted the burden to prove the voluntariness of proffered
statements beyond reasonable doubt. See Prosecutor v. Halilovic, Case No. IT-01-48-T,
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Building on this foundation, in 2004, the Bagosora Trial Chamber at
the ICTR concluded that the standard set out by the Celebici Trial Chamber
applied equally to the OTP's obligation to establish that the suspect's right
to counsel had been voluntarily waived.122 In 2007, the Karemera Trial
Chamber followed suit.123 By 2008, this existing jurisprudence caused Trial
Chamber I of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to "recognise[] the
established principle of law which lays on the Prosecution the burden of
proving 'convincingly and beyond a reasonable doubt' the voluntariness of
an Accused's statement made in a custodial setting and of the waiver of his
right to counsel during interrogation." 24
c. The International Criminal Court
Neither the ICC Statute nor its Rules of Procedure and Evidence dictate
the standard that ought to be met in order to establish a valid waiver of a
questioned suspect's rights under Article 55 and, given that it is still
relatively early days for the ICC, the Court's jurisprudence has yet to speak
to the question. When the ICC ultimately addresses the issue, however, it is
likely to turn to the precedent established by its predecessor courts, in
particular, the ICTY. 12 This the Court has already done in other contexts,126
with ICTY precedent having particular force when the Court's provisions
closely track those in place at the Tribunal.127 Indeed, although the ICC has
Decision on Admission into Evidence of Interview of Accused, 1 7 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Jun. 20, 2005).
122 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
for the Admission of Certain Materials under Rule 89(C), TT 17-18 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda Oct. 14, 2004) (citing the Mucic decision while highlighting "the importance of the
right to counsel and the precariousness of its exercise by a suspect in detention").
123 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion
for Admission into Evidence of Post-Arrest Interviews with Joseph Nzirorera and Mathieu
Ngirumpatse, 31 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 2, 2007).
124 Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case. No. SCSL-04-15-T, Written Reasons- Decision on the
Admissibility of Certain Prior Statements of the Accused Given to the Prosecution, 36
(Special Ct. for Sierra Leone June 30, 2008) (citing to both Bagosora and the Celebici
decision). See also Prosecutor v. Sesay, Case. No. SCSL-04-15-T, Ruling on Voir Dire -
Written Reasons, 115 (Special Ct. for Sierra Leone Nov. 2, 2007).
125 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE UN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS: THE
FORMER YUGOSLAVIA, RWANDA AND SIERRA LEONE 44 (2006) (remarking upon the legacy
of the work of the ICTY and noting that its case law, and that of its sister tribunal, the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, "will provide immense guidance to the
International Criminal Court").
126 See, e.g., Megan A. Fairlie, The Precedent of Pretrial Release at the ICTY: A Road
Better Left Less Traveled, 33 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. I101 (2010) (considering the influence of
ICTY precedent upon ICC pre-trial release determinations).
127 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 OA 11, Judgment
on the Appeal of Mr. Lubanga Dyilo against the Oral Decision of Trial Chamber I of 18
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yet to address the matter directly, parties have already argued before it for
the Court follow the existing international precedent by requiring that waiver
be established beyond a reasonable doubt.
d. Summary
In sum, international courts have thus far evidenced a commitment to
ensuring that their prosecutors do indeed bear a heavy burden when it comes
to establishing waiver of a questioned suspect's rights. In effect, and in line
with the Miranda command, the beyond a reasonable doubt standard in
place creates a strong assurance that involuntary confessions will not be
admitted at international criminal trials. By contrast, having adopted the
least exacting standard of proof for Miranda waiver, the US approach
objectively increases the likelihood that suspect statements will be
erroneously admitted at trial,129 eases the government's path to conviction,
and lies indisputably at odds with the language and tenor of the original
opinion. What is more, when coupled with the Supreme Court's current
approach to the form required for an effective waiver, as discussed in the
next section, the chasm between contemporary Miranda doctrine and the
original Supreme Court decision (and the aligned international approach)
continues to widen.
2. The Form of an Effective Waiver
a. The Miranda doctrine
Although the Miranda opinion fails to specifically require an express
waiver, the decision is replete with language indicating that this was its
intention. Indeed, the Court found fault with the process provided in one of
Miranda's companion cases in part because there was no evidence of "an
articulated waiver of rights." 30 More directly, the Miranda majority noted
that the "failure to ask for a lawyer does not constitute a waiver;"' 3 1 that
January 2008, 178 (July 11, 2008).
128 See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-T-41Transcript,
pp 6-7 (July 2, 2008) (relying on the standard for establishing voluntariness and waiver as set
out respectively by the Celebici and Bagosora Trial Chambers), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related
%20cases/icc%200104%200107/transcripts/Pages/index.aspx; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07- OA 8, Defence Objections to Admissibility in Principal and
Substance, 71 (Oct. 23, 2009).
129 "The standard of proof influences the relative frequency of... erroneous outcomes." In
re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 371 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
130 Miranda at 496.
'' Id. at 470.
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"[n]o effective waiver of the right to counsel during interrogation can be
recognized unless specifically made;"l 32 and that "a valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are
given." 33 In light of this language, it is little surprise that Justice Harlan
presumed, in a dissent joined by Justices Stewart and White, that "some
affirmative statement" was required for waiver.134
Notwithstanding this observation, both Stewart and White would later
maintain that Miranda waiver can be inferred.'35 Writing for five members
of the Court on this issue in Butler v. North Carolina, one-time Miranda
dissenter Justice Stewart made note of Miranda's conclusion that "a valid
waiver will not be presumed simply from the silence of the accused"' 36 and
then employed an analysis that placed particular emphasis on the word
"simply."' 3  This enabled Stewart to craft an argument that harmonized
waiver by inference with Miranda; according to the Butler court, while
silence alone cannot constitute waiver, "silence, coupled with an
understanding of [] rights and a course of conduct indicating waiver" can.' 38
Yet, as other commentators have observed, waiver by inference is rather
plainly contrary to both the tenor and intent of Miranda. 139 Indeed, Justice
Brennan-again the only remaining Miranda majority member then on the
Court-pointed to Miranda's language that waiver must be "specifically
made" 4 in support of the more plausible conclusion that Miranda requires
affirmative waiver.141 More significantly, Brennan highlighted an
132 id
3 Id at 475.
134 Id. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting). See also id. at 516-17 (criticizing numerous
additional aspects of the rules created by Miranda, including a perceived express waiver
requirement). Remarkably, Justice Clark's dissent expressed the view that the majority opinion
actually enabling a suspect to implicitly invoke his rights. Id. at 500 (Clark, J., dissenting)
(interpreting Miranda's rules as requiring that interrogation cease if "the accused seeks
affirmatively or impliedly to invoke his rights to silence or counsel").
us North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979). By that time, Justice Harlan was
no longer on the Court.
136 Id at 373 (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. 436).
13 Id (concluding that "silence alone" cannot constitute waiver).
138 Id
13 See, e.g., James J. Tomkovicz, Standards for Invocation and Waiver of Counsel in
Confession Contexts, 71 IOWA L. REv. 975, 1045 (1986) (describing Butler's acceptance of
implicit waiver as "[c]ontrary to the apparent intent of the Miranda opinion"); see also 2
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S. KERR, CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 393 (5th ed. 2009) ("[T]he tone and language of the majority opinion in Miranda
seemed to indicate that the Court would be receptive to nothing short of an express waiver of
the rights involved.").
14o Butler, 441 U.S. at 377 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Miranda, 384 U.S. at 470).
141 Id
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irreconcilable tension between the Butler opinion and Miranda. Miranda's
determination that custodial interrogation is inherently coercive and
designed to "subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner," 42
logically dictates that any uncertainties surrounding the interrogation-such
as those that are bound to accompany an assessment of waiver by
inference-ought to be interpreted against the state. 143
After the Butler court sanctioned implied waiver, lower courts picked
up on the cue that the government's "heavy burden" could actually be
established by a rather light showing.144 In fact, a review of pertinent
appellate opinions conducted some two decades later revealed that "once the
prosecutor proves that the warnings were given in a language that the
suspect understands, courts find waiver in almost every case. Miranda
waiver is extraordinarily easy to show- basically that the suspect answered
police questions after saying that he understood the warnings."1 45 Similar to
the custody analysis above, an examination of another recent decision
rendered by the Roberts Court is illustrative of the incongruence between the
current Supreme Court doctrine regarding waiver and the Miranda opinion.
i. Contemporary waiver
In the 2010 case of Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Supreme Court
considered whether Thompkins, a homicide suspect, had effectively waived
his Miranda rights before he made incriminating statements.146 At the outset
of his interrogation, Thompkins was provided with a form delineating his
rights under Miranda as five separate warnings. 147 Upon being asked, he
read the fifth warning aloud; the remaining warnings were then read to him
by one of the interrogating officers.148 It is unclear if Thompkins was then
asked if he understood his rights.149 He was, however, expressly asked to
sign a waiver form so as demonstrate his understanding, which he refused to
do. 50
142 Id at 377-78 (quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457).
143 id.
44 Kamisar, supra note 25, at 181-82.
"I George C. Thomas III, Separated at Birth but Siblings Nonetheless: Miranda and the
Due Process Notice Cases, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1081, 1082 (2001) ("The Miranda version of the
Fifth Amendment permits waiver to be made carelessly, inattentively, and without counsel.").
146 Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250 (2010).
147 Id at 2256.
148 Id.
149 Id. at 2266-67 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). The officer who provided Thompkins with
the Miranda form at one point testified that he believed he asked Thompkins if he understood
his rights and that Thompkins assented. He later testified, however, that he didn't know
whether he asked Thompkins if he understood his rights. Id at 2267, n.1.
1so Id. at 2256.
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What followed then was an almost three hour interrogation, described
by one of the interrogating officers as "nearly a monologue."15 1 For two
hours and 45 minutes of that time, Thompkins said almost nothing beyond
responding to the offer of a peppermint and complaining about the chair in
which he was seated.152 Thompkins ultimately broke down, however, when
asked if he believed in God. 15 To this question and the two that followed,
Thompkins answered "yes," admitting that he prayed and that he asked God
for forgiveness for the homicide for which he was a suspect.154
That waiver was even a debatable question under this set of facts
demonstrates how far afield current doctrine has ventured from the Miranda
opinion and the concerns that animated it. As if speaking to the facts in
Thompkins, the Miranda court noted that "a valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given, or
simply from the fact that a confession was, in fact, eventually obtained.", 55
The Miranda court further maintained that where a suspect is-as
Thompkins was-subjected to lengthy, incommunicado interrogation before
making a statement, this would constitute strong evidence against a finding
of waiver.156 Indeed, the opinion points out that when a suspect ultimately
succumbs to interrogation under such circumstances, the very fact of
capitulation reinforces "the conclusion that the compelling influence of the
interrogation finally forced him to do so."'s7
Despite this language, in a decision that "fired point-blank at
Miranda,"'58 five members of the Court concluded that Thompkins had
waived his rights by confessing. 59 According to the Thompkins Court, the
government had met its Miranda burden by establishing that warnings were
given, understood and followed-albeit several hours later-by an
uncoerced statement. 1o Part and parcel of the Thompkins decision,
I' Idat 2267.
152 Id. at 2256-57 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
1 Id. at 2257.
154 id
" Miranda at 475. See Yale Kamisar, The Rise, Decline and Fall(?) of Miranda, 87
WASH. L.REv. 965, 1018 (2012) ("This caution no longer appears to be operative.").
16 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 476.
15 Id.
18 Kamisar, supra note 155, at 1019.
I "Thompkins knowingly and voluntarily made a statement to police, so he waived his
right to remain silent." Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2263 (concluding, at 2260, that Thompkins'
post-Miranda silence of almost three hours was insufficient to invoke his rights to cut off
questioning and to remain silent).
"6 "Where the prosecution shows that a Miranda warnmg was given and that it was
understood by the accused, an accused's uncoerced statement establishes an implied waiver of
the right to remain silent . .. The record in this case shows that Thompkins waived his right to
remain silent." Id. at 2262 (concluding, at 2262-63, that there was no basis for concluding that
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therefore, is the conclusion that interrogating officers are not required to
obtain a waiver before commencing an interrogation.161 In effect, then, the
message from Thompkins is that the government may use the compulsion
inherent to incommunicado custodial interrogation to obtain the very
statement that constitutes waiver, resulting in a tension with the Miranda
decision that could hardly be more profound.162 By contrast, the
international criminal courts require that suspects waive the right to be
questioned in the presence of counsel before such questioning can take place
and that the suspect's waiver be expressly made.
b. The Shared Approach
The language of Rule 42, shared by the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL,
prohibits questioning a suspect outside the presence of counsel unless and
until the suspect has voluntarily waived the right to the presence of
counsel.163 That Rule 42 so requires was reaffirmed by the Bagosora Trial
Chamber of the ICTR'6 in a decision that also considers an issue not
expressly addressed by the Rule: the appropriate form of waiver.165 Drawing
support both from existing ICTY jurisprudencel66 and the 1966 Miranda
decision,'6 7 the Trial Chamber concluded that suspect waiver cannot be
implied. Rather, waiver "must be express and unequivocal, and must clearly
Thompkins didn't understand his rights, that "[i]fThompkins wanted to remain silent, he could
have said nothing" and that there was no evidence of coercion).
161 Id. at 2263 (alleging that a requirement that the government first establish waiver is
inconsistent with the prospect of implicit waiver made possible by Butler).
162 "It is hard to believe that the Miranda Court, a Court which was so troubled by in-
custody police interrogation, would (a) require the police to warn custodial suspects of their
rights, yet (b) permit the police to intimidate, mislead, deceive, bluff, coax, or trick these same
suspects into "waiving" their rights by subjecting them to interrogation." Kamisar, supra note
155, at 1015.
63 "Questioning of a suspect shall not proceed without the presence of counsel unless the
suspect has voluntarily waived his right to counsel." ICTY RPE, supra note 42, at R. 42(B);
ICTR RPE, supra note 42, at R. 42(B); SCSL RPE, supra note 42, at R. 42(B).
64 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
for the Admission of Certain Materials under Rule 89(C), T 17 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Oct. 14, 2004).
i6s Prior to the Bagosora decision, it could have been argued that express waiver was not
required in the case of suspect questioning, as the Rules do not explicitly require this form of
waiver regarding the questioning of an accused person. See ICTY RPE, supra note 42, at
R.42(B); ICTR RPE, supra note 42, at R. 42(B); SCSL RPE, supra note 42, at R. 42(B).
166 Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion for the
Admission of Certain Materials under Rule 89(C), at n.16 (citing the Celebici decision).
' Id. (using Miranda's assertion that "[a]n express statement that the individual is willing
to make a statement and does not want an attorney followed closely by a statement could
constitute a waiver").
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relate to the interview in which the statement in question is taken."l 68
c. The International Criminal Court
At the ICC, a to-be questioned suspect must be informed of the right
"[t]o be questioned in the presence of counsel unless the person has
voluntarily waived his or her right to counsel."l69 That waiver must then be
affirmatively obtained prior to questioning is implicitly required by the ICC
Rules. These provide that whenever the Prosecutor conducts questioning
outside the presence of counsel, she is required to record the questioned
170person's waiver in writing, and, if possible, to either audio or videotape it.
Thus, the international approach to waiver adheres to Miranda's
command that waiver be "specifically made." In addition, the relevant
temporal requirements imposed for waiver by international criminal courts
mean that a Berghuis-typel71 situation, in which an investigator advises the
suspect of his right to counsel but opts to commence with a lengthy
interrogation without confirming the suspect has voluntarily waived his
rights, would constitute a procedural violation. As such, unlike
contemporary U.S. practice, and wholly in accord with the Miranda
decision, 172 the international approach precludes the possibility that the
compelling atmosphere of interrogation may somehow be utilized to obtain a
valid waiver.
d Summary
With the now lessened burden for waiver, both by allowing for waiver
by inference and requiring that waiver need only be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, "establishing a valid waiver [has] turned out
to be a much less formidable feat than one would have supposed from
reading the Miranda opinion."173 Coupled with the narrowing of Miranda's
custodial trigger earlier discussed, the picture that begins to emerge is one in
which "international Miranda" appears both more in tune with the original
opinion than contemporary U.S. practice and more rights-protective. Yet this
168 Id 18.
169 Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art. 55(2)(d).
170 Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court r. I I2(l)(b),
(Sept. 3, 2002).
17. See supra notes 158 et. seq. and accompanying text.
172 "it is hard to believe that the Miranda Court, a Court which was so troubled by in-
custodial police interrogation, would (a) require the police to warn custodial suspects of their
rights, yet (b) permit the police to intimidate, mislead, deceive, bluff, coax, or trick these same
suspects into "waiving" their rights by subjecting them to interrogation." Kamisar, supra note
155, at 1015.
113 Kamisar, supra note 25, at 180.
28 [Vol. 20:1
Miranda and its International Counterparts
conclusion can, of course, only prove true if procedural violations are
accompanied by valuable remedies. 74 In this regard, one can anticipate that
naysayers will be quick to point out that the international approach comes up
short, because it fails to require exclusion as the automatic remedy. Before
considering the value of the international protections in practice, then, it
makes sense to examine these disparate approaches to exclusion, and to
probe the assumption that Miranda's automatic exclusionary rule is
automatically more rights-protective.
C. Remedial Responses to Interrogation Violations
Unlike Miranda, which mandates both the rights of questioned suspects
and the remedy of exclusion for relevant violations, statements obtained in
violation of the rights delineated by international criminal courts are not
automatically excluded. Rather, under the shared approach, such statements
are analyzed primarily pursuant to Rule 95, which provides: "no evidence
shall be admissible if obtained by methods which cast substantial doubt on
its reliability or if its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously
damage, the integrity of the proceedings."1 75 In similar-albeit more
exacting-language, ICC Article 69(7) requires exclusion whenever
evidence is obtained in violation of the ICC Statute or internationally
recognized human rights and the evidence is either consequently unreliable
or its admission "would be antithetical to and would seriously damage the
integrity of the proceedings."' 76
' "Remedies are the life of rights . . . Deprivation of a remedy is equivalent to a
deprivation of the right which it is intended to vindicate, unless another remedy exists or is
substituted for that which is taken away." Campbell v. Holt, 115 U.S. 620, 631 (1885)
(Bradley, J., dissenting). See also Michael Mello, Nine Scorpions in a Bottle, 44 No. I CRIM.
L. BULL. ART 1, 4 (2008) (noting that a right can be eviscerated by attacking its remedy).
' ICTY RPE, supra note 42, at R. 95; ICTR RPE, supra note 42, at R. 95. The SCSL's
exclusionary rule focuses solely on the integrity of the proceedings: "No evidence shall be
admitted if its admission would bring the administration of justice into serious disrepute."
SCSL RPE, supra note 42, at R. 95. At the ICTY, Rule 89(D) provides an additional basis for
exclusion, bestowing upon chambers the power to "exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the need to ensure a fair trial." As there is no such provision at
either the ICTR or the SCSL, and the sub-rule does not play a role in the ICTY case-law
considered herein, it is not the subject of further discussion in this piece.
176 Rome Statute, supra note 7, at art . 69(7). This language has been legitimately
criticized: "Does admission of evidence obtained in violation of human rights not by definition
damage the integrity of the proceedings?" ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 52, at 382. An
additional ICC sub-article, 69(4) might also be viewed as an exclusionary rule of a sort, as it
permits the Court to consider "the probative value of the evidence and any prejudice that such
evidence may cause to a fair trial or to a fair evaluation of the testimony of a witness" when
ruling on the admissibility of a piece of evidence.
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1. Automatic Versus Discretionary Rules of Exclusion
At first blush, the presence of these non-automatic exclusionary rules
suggests a significant divergence from Miranda's mandate of exclusion.
Faithfully applied, the international exclusionary rules dictate a discretionary
approach to admissibility. 177 Every violation of a suspect's interrogation
rights requires a case-by-case analysis, in which the relevant Chamber
considers whether, in its view and bearing in mind the circumstances in
which the statements were obtained, the statements are reliable. Assuming
the answer to this question is "yes," the Chamber must then assess and opine
as to whether admitting the statements would nevertheless damage the
integrity of the proceedings. Given this flexibility, it is perhaps
understandable that there is a certain amount of skepticism regarding such an
approach. 17 8
Amongst other potential problems,179 a discretionary approach to
exclusion may in fact render rights protections weak. 80 Even still, however,
it is not necessarily true that a discretionary approach to exclusion "simply
does not provide the protections against illegally obtained evidence to which
17 This article frequently distinguishes Miranda's rule of automatic exclusion from the
international approach to exclusion by describing the former as mandatory and the latter as
discretionary in nature. This approach merits a brief explanation in light of the fact that Rule
95 and ICC Article 69(7) are sometimes described as "mandatory exclusion rules." See, e.g.,
Amal Alamuddin, Collection of Evidence, in PRINCIPLES OF EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 231, 239, 284 (Karim A. A. Khan, et al. eds., 2010). Kweku Vanderpuye,
The International Criminal Court and Discretionary Evidential Exclusion, 14 TUL. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 127, 129 (2005) ("[N]otwithstanding an established violation of either the [the ICC
Statute] or [international human rights], the admissibility of the evidence obtained is further
qualified and relegated to the discretion of the court."). Presumably the decision to so describe
these provisions stems from the fact that whenever a Chamber concludes that the evidence at
issue is unreliable or that its admission would seriously damage the integrity of the
proceedings, exclusion is required. Describing these provisions as "mandatory exclusion
rules," however, is unhelpful if not misleading, as exclusion is "mandatory" only in the wake
of a Chamber's discretionary analysis regarding the reliability of the evidence at issue and/or
the manner in which its admission would affect the integrity of the proceedings. Cf Kelly
Pitcher, Addressing Violations of International Criminal Procedure, 17, Amsterdamn Law
School Research Paper No. 2013-42, Amsterdam Center for International Law No. 2013-14
(2013).
171 See, e.g., David Admire, The International Criminal Court Re-visited: An American
Perspective, 15 TEX. REV. L & POL. 339, 357 (2011).
'7 See, e.g., Vanderpuye, supra note 177, at 176 (opining that a flexible approach to
exclusion undermines "the certainty of legal outcomes, and uniformity in the administration of
justice . .. . [thereby] inject[ing] instability into the process").
s See, e.g., Binyamin Blum, "Exclude Evidence, You Exclude Justice"? A Critical
Evaluation oflsrael's Exclusionary Rule After Issacharov, 16 Sw. J. INT'L L. 385, 447 (2010)
(deriding Israel's adoption of a discretionary exclusionary rule as having "provided a false
hope that from now on police abuses would bear consequences").
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Americans are accustomed."18 I Rather, it seems more accurate to conclude
that discretionary rules of exclusion do not provide the protections
Americans believe their system affords.
Indeed, and quite likely unbeknownst to most non-lawyers,' 82
Miranda's reach (and, therefore, the reach and import of the decision's
mandatory exclusionary rule) has been significantly limited, even well
beyond the narrowing the definition of Miranda custody and the easing of
the requirements for waiver thus far considered. In fact, there is a veritable
laundry list of exceptions to Miranda's mandate of exclusion, the seminal
decision's admonition that "the prosecution may not use statements, whether
exculpatory or inculpatory. . .unless it demonstrates the use of procedural
safeguards effective to secure the privilege against self-incrimination"' 83
notwithstanding. Pursuant to post-Miranda Supreme Court jurisprudence,
statements obtained in violation of Miranda may later be used by the
government for a number of purposes, including grand jury proceedings 84
and in order to impeach a defendant at trial. 1 In addition, a waming-less
statement obtained during custodial interrogation may be used at trial to
establish the guilt of its maker whenever the public safety exception
applies.8
What is more, even when Miranda 's automatic exclusionary rule
actually does come into effect, it precludes only the use of the compelled
statements in the government's case-in-chief, but erects no admissibility
barrier to the fruits of those statements. Despite Miranda's admonition that
without warnings and waiver "no evidence obtained as a result of
interrogation can be used,"' language that Justice Ginsburg rightly noted
"sounds like ... a derivative evidence rule,"'88 the Supreme Court has since
' Admire, supra note 178, at 357.
18 See, e.g.:., Friedman, supra note 19 at 42 (contending that Supreme Court decisions
narrowing Miranda successfully speak to two audiences, leaving the public unaware of the
limitations placed upon the decision they highly favor, and the media ill-equipped to rectify
this problem); Peters, supra note 21, at 1090 (noting that most non-lawyers learn about
Supreme Court decisions through the media and that the latter are unlikely to report that
constitutional precedent had been overruled unless the Court expressly acknowledges having
done so); Sanchez, supra note 21.
8 Miranda at 444 (1966).
84 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
'8 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). "Prior to Harris, [Miranda] had been
widely-indeed almost unanimously-interpreted to preclude the impeachment use of
statements obtained in violation of its rules." Alan M. Dershowitz & John Hart Ely, Harris v.
New York: Some Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority, 80 YALE L.J. 1198, 1208 (1971).
86 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
* Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.
8 Oral Argument at 6:47, United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630 (2003) (No. 02-1183),
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sanctioned the admission of physical evidence discovered as a direct result
of Miranda violations,189 irrespective of whether or not the violation was
intentional. 190
In effect, Miranda's automatic exclusionary rule has inspired the Court
to find ways around its applicability, resulting in a doctrine that weakens
Miranda's ability to protect the rights of questioned suspects and providing
little to no incentive for law enforcement to honor those rights. A dubiously
obtained statement will provide fodder for impeachment should the accused
testify, may lead to admissible derivative evidence' 9' and just might,
depending on the circumstances, be deemed admissible.
Undeniably, this string of exceptions to Miranda 's remedy of exclusion
further causes the current doctrine to be markedly at odds with the Miranda
decision. Simply put, each potential exemption incentivizes the very conduct
that the Miranda court found so objectionable.192 As with the narrowing of
the definition of Miranda custody, the message from these post-Miranda
decisions has affected law enforcement training and practice, with officers
taught to "go outside" Miranda in order to obtain useful evidence.193 As
Justice Brennan once observed, such exceptions "only invite the very
[interrogation] methods" that the Miranda court sought to terminate.194
As a result, this whittling of Miranda's aims and values has caused
even its supporters to conclude that the opinion is "on the verge of
available at http://www.oyez.org/cases/2000-2009/2003/2003_02_1183.
19 United States v. Patane, 542 U.S. 630, 643-44 (2004). See also Yale Kamisar,
Postscript: Another Look at Patane and Seibert, the 2004 Miranda Poisoned Fruit Cases, 2
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 97, 111 (2004) ("1 have no doubt that if the case had come before the
Supreme Court a short time after Miranda was decided, the Court would have thrown out the
fruits of a deliberate failure to comply with Miranda whether or not the fruits were
'testimonial'.").
1' Wisconsin v. Knapp, 542 U.S. 952 (2004) (vacating a lower court decision to exclude
physical evidence obtained as a direct result of an intentional Miranda violation pursuant to
Patane).
"' Anthony J. Domanico, Michael D. Cicchini & Lawrence T. White, Overcoming
Miranda: A Content Analysis of the Miranda Portion of Police Interrogation, 49 IDAHO L.
REv. 1, 6 n.31 (2012) ("[R]egardless of the law, the police are always better off by
interrogating a suspect even if he refuses to waive his Miranda rights.").
192 See, e.g., People v. Peevy, 17 Cal.4th 1184, 1214 (1998) (holding that the Harris
impeachment rule applies even when a police officer deliberately fails to honor a suspect's
request for counsel with the objective of securing evidence for impeachment purposes).
' "Going outside Miranda is simply a euphemism for violating Miranda." Linda
Deutsch, Miranda Rights Again Come to Light, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Nov. 9, 1999,
http://www.apnewsarchive.com/1999/Miranda-Rights-Again-Come-to-Light/id-
80f578a7bf48495Iadbc0d45667Idl 61 (quoting Yale Kamisar).
194 Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 320 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Nardone v.
United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939)).
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extinction,"l95 and that "little is left of Miranda's vaunted safeguards and
what is left is not worth retaining."l96 Accordingly, it is against this more
complete picture of contemporary Miranda that the international approach-
in particular its use of discretionary rules of exclusion-ought to be
assessed. With that noted, however, the protections afforded by international
criminal practice do not require the weaknesses of the contemporary
Miranda doctrine to make them appear more just. In fact, despite the
existing concerns that discretionary rules of exclusion afford weak
protection, this has not proven to be the case in any instance in which
international criminal courts have assessed faulty suspect interrogations.
2. Rights Enforcement for Questioned International Criminal
Suspects
As the following discussion illustrates, violations of the rights bestowed
upon international criminal suspects during questioning realm have
consistently resulted in exclusion, 197 notwithstanding the applicability of
discretionary suppression rules. In fact, in sharp contrast to the U.S.
trajectory post-Miranda, the jurisprudence elucidating the rights that
international criminal suspects are due when questioned has become
increasingly robust over time. As a result, the jurisprudence of the ICTY,
ICTR and the SCSL has developed in a way that is on the whole more
faithful to the values of Miranda than contemporary U.S. jurisprudence.
a. Robust Exclusion under the Shared Approach
The first earnest consideration of the rights enjoyed by a questioned
international suspect occurred in 1997 in the ICTY's Celebici trial. In that
matter, Trial Chamber I contemplated the admissibility of statements made
by then-suspect Zdravko Mucic to the Austrian officials who had arrested
him at the Tribunal's request. 198 Consistent with both existing Austrian law
and, arguably, international human rights law as it then was,' 9 but contrary
1 Alfredo Garcia, Is Miranda Dead, Was It Overruled, or Is It Irrelevant?, 10 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 461, 462 (1998) ("[T]here is not much left to Miranda - the patient is either
on life support or clinically dead."); Illan M. Romano, Is Miranda on the Verge of Extinction?
The Supreme Court Loosens Miranda's Grip in Favor of Law Enforcement, 35 NOVA L. REV.
525 (2011).
'96 Weisselberg, supra note 20, at 1524.
'9 Alamuddin, supra note 177, at 280.
198 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Judgement 1 30 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Nov. 16, 1998).
199 It was not until eleven years later that the European Court of Human Rights declared
that "as a rule, access to a lawyer should be provided as from the first interrogation of a
suspect by the police, unless it is demonstrated in the light of the particular circumstances of
2013] 33
University of California, Davis
to the dictates of the Tribunal, Mucic was denied the opportunity to have
access to counsel until after his interrogation.200 Although the Trial Chamber
found that the Austrian officials were not acting as agents of the prosecutor,
and that the purpose of the Austrian interview was directed toward Mucic's
extradition, the Chamber nevertheless opted to provide robust protection
for Mucic's rights as a suspect, excluding the statements made to the
Austrian authorities because they had been obtained in breach of his right to
counsel as set out in the Tribunal's Statute and Rules.202
The decision to hold the Austrian interrogation to the standards in place
at the ICTY was not an obvious one. Indeed, the safeguards imposed by
Rule 42 are expressly triggered only when a suspect "is to be questioned by
the prosecutor." Judicial commentary during oral arguments suggests that
the determination to nevertheless apply the Tribunal's rules to the Austrian
interrogation may have been motivated by the worry that a contrary
conclusion could lead to objectionable results. The panel expressed concern
that admitting information acquired in the domestic interrogation might
incentivize the prosecution to utilize statements obtained under less
protective domestic standards, rather than obtaining its own evidence under
the rigors of Rule 42.203 While this hardly seems an idle concern, it
nevertheless does little to support the Chamber's ultimate conclusion that the
statements to the Austrian authorities were obtained in violation of Rule 42
and, consequently, "null and inadmissible in proceedings before [the
ICTY] .204
By excluding the statements on this basis,205 rather than availing of
each case that there are compelling reasons to restrict this right." Salduz v. Turkey, 49 Eur. Ct.
H.R. 421, 55 (2008).
200 Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-2 I-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic's Motion for
the Exclusion of Evidence, 118-9 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 2, 1997).
201 Id. 40.
202 Id. 52. See also Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Trial Transcript 4050
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 1997), available at http://www.icty.org/
x/cases/mucic/trans/en/9706121T.htm.
203 As Judge Jan observed, by "only producing the statement recorded under the national
system and national laws[,] Rule 42 can be bypassed easily." Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Trial Transcript 4050.
204 Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T, Decision on Zdravko Mucic's Motion for the Exclusion
of Evidence, at 55 (excluding the statements pursuant to ICTY Rule 5, a provision titled
"Non-compliance with Rules"). See also id. 1 47 (noting that non-compliance with Rule 42
"will render the act null under Rule 5"). The only remedy then available under Rule 5 was to
declare the non-compliant act a nullity. The rule was amended shortly after the 1997 decision.
It now provides Trial Chambers broad discretion in determining the appropriate relief for rule
violations. ICTY RPE, supra note 42, at R.5.
205 See also MOHAMED SHAHABUDDEEN, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AT THE
YUGOSLAv TRIBUNAL: A JUDGE'S RECOLLECTION 136 (2012) (attributing exclusion in the
matter to Rule 5, a provision governing non-compliance with the rules).
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Rule 95 20-the aforementioned exclusionary rule-the Chamber avoided
concluding that the Austrian procedures then employed were in violation of
international human rights law.207 In fact, the Chamber expressly concluded
that the Austrian practice "[did] not fall below fundamental fairness and
such as to render admission [of the statements] antithetical to or to seriously
damage the integrity of the proceedings." 208 At the same time, however, the
Trial Chamber made a rather sweeping statement in dictum: "It seems to us
extremely difficult for a statement taken in violation of Rule 42 to fall within
Rule 95 which protects the integrity of the proceedings by the non-
admissibility of evidence obtained by methods which cast substantial doubts
on its reliability."209 Rather remarkably, this non-essential observation
appears to have notably contributed to an ultimately robust application of
Rule 95 at the ICTR210 in cases addressing rights violations of international
criminal suspect's rights during interrogation.
In fact, the language from the Celebici decision was later cited
expressly by both the Bagosora and Karemera Trial Chambers in support of
their rulings to exclude statements that had been obtained improperly by the
prosecution.211 In effect, these later decisions came to embrace the notion,
206 Because the opinion is not a model of clarity, many have mistakenly concluded that the
Chamber suppressed Mucic's statements pursuant to Rule 95, the tribunal's aforementioned
exclusionary rule. See, e.g., VLADIMIR TOCHILOVSKY, JURISPRUDENCE OF THE
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS:
PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE 253 (2008); ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 52, at 305 (attributing
exclusion of the statements to Austrian police to the application of ICTY R. 95); Alamuddin,
supra note 177, at 280; Richard May & Marieke Wierda, Trends in International Criminal
Evidence: Nuremberg, Tokyo, The Hague and Arusha, 37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 725, 762
(1999) (contending that Rule 95 was applied);). See also Gregory S. Gordon, Toward an
International Criminal Procedure, 45 COLUMB. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 635, 672 n.228 (2007)
(concluding that the Court found a violation of international human rights law and that this
mandated exclusion).
207 "Even if it is conceded that the Austrian provision restricting the right to counsel is
within Article 6(3)(C) as interpreted, there is no doubt it is inconsistent with the unfettered
right to counsel in Article 18(3) and Sub-rule 42(A)(i)." Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-T,
Decision on Zdravko Mucic's Motion for the Exclusion of Evidence, at 51.
208 Id. 55. In addition, the Chamber also implicitly acknowledged the reliability of the
statements, concluding that the Austrian officials had not induced Mucic to speak, as "telling a
suspect that a confession would on conviction assist in mitigation of punishment is not so
strong as to induce a confession." Id. at 1 54.
209 Id. 43.
210 Notably, unlike the ICTY, the ICTR does not have a provision that enables its
chambers to exclude evidence when its probative value is substantially outweighed by the need
to ensure a fair trial. See ICTR RPE, supra note 42, at R. 95. As a result, greater use has been
made of Rule 95 at the ICTR than at the ICTY. Nancy Amoury Combs, Evidence, in
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 323, 328 (William A. Schabas & Nadia
Bemaz eds., 2010).
211 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's
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in cases where the prosecution was at fault, that "it is difficult to imagine a
statement taken in violation of the fundamental right to the assistance of
counsel which would not require its exclusion under Rule 95."212 Indeed, by
late 2007, the belief that exclusion was the required remedy for a violation
of Rule 42 had become firmly entrenched at the Rwandan court. As the
Nchamihigo Trial Chamber maintained upon finding that OTP investigators
had not adequately respected a suspect's right to counsel, "[i]t is well settled
that a statement taken from a suspect would not be admitted into evidence at
his trial if his rights during the investigation were not respected." 213
b. Automatic Exclusion despite Discretionary Rules?
Given the force of the aforementioned language, coupled with a
consistent pattern of exclusion for Rule 42 violations, it is perhaps no
surprise that these decisions excluding wrongfully obtained statements have
drawn criticism for appearing to "come closer to an automatic exclusion of
evidence .. .than the explicit language of Rule 95 requires, 2 14 and that
perhaps "the test [set out in Rule 95] is not triggered at all." 215  Before
disputing these critiques, though, it is worthwhile to first consider whether a
move towards automatic exclusion would make sense for these courts.
Generally speaking, it seems unlikely that any trial chamber would opt
to automatically exclude wrongfully obtained statements, particularly in
light of the udiciary's self-generated, discretionary authority to rule on
admissibility. 16 Indeed, after drafting and adopting the rules that would
Motion for the Admission of Certain Materials under Rule 89(C), 1 21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for
Rwanda Oct. 14, 2004); Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the
Prosecution Motion for Admission into Evidence of Post-Arrest Interviews with Joseph
Nzirorera and Mathieu Ngirumpatse, 25 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 2, 2007).
212 Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion for
Admission into Evidence of Post-Arrest Interviews with Joseph Nzirorera and Mathieu
Ngirumpatse, at 25.
213 Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-01-63-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application to Admit into Evidence the Transcript of the Accused's Interview as a Suspect and
the Defense's Request to Hold a Voir Dire, 21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Feb. 5, 2007).
In fact, even the Extraordinary Chambers of the Courts of Cambodia recognize that exclusion
is the "usual remedy" in such circumstances. Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav, Case No. 001/18-
07-2007/ECCC/TC, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case File as Evidence, 1 19 (May 26,
2009).
214 Alamuddin,supra note 177, at 281.
2 Id at 303 (suggesting that Rule 42 contains a "set of 'super' rights whose violation
automatically results in exclusion").
216 "The judges of the International Tribunal shall adopt rules of procedure and evidence
for the conduct of the pre-trial phase of the proceedings, trials and appeals, the admission of
evidence, the protection of victims and witnesses and other appropriate matters." S.C. Res.
827, art. 15, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (May 25, 1993).
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govern the ICTY-and that would later form a template for the ICTR and
SCSL-then-President Antonio Cassese emphasized that the rules were
designed to "minimise the possibility of a charge being dismissed on
technical grounds for lack of evidence." 2 17 Early ICTY and ICTR
jurisprudence arguably evidences a resolute commitment to this concern. In
fact, as of 2002, Rule 95 appeared never to have been applied at either the
ICTY or ICTR, prompting one commentator to conclude that "the lack of
mandatory exclusionary rules amounts to no exclusionary rule at all."2 18
While later jurisprudence puts this concern to rest, it likewise refutes
any notion of automatic exclusion. As ICTY Trial Chamber II made plain,
"in applying the provisions of Rule 95, this Tribunal considers all the
relevant circumstances and will only exclude evidence if the integrity of the
proceedings would indeed otherwise be seriously damaged."219 In addition to
this faithfulness to the rules, there is an even more basic argument against
the possibility that evidence would automatically be excluded: it is highly
unlikely that judges would opt to surrender their discretionary authority. The
rules governing tribunal proceedings "grant the trial chambers a great deal of
leeway in determining the admissibility of evidence, certainly more than that
available to courts in common law criminal jurisdictions." 220 It therefore
seems fair to ask whether it would make sense for any judicial panel to elect
to trade this discretionary authority in order to be bound by a rule of
automatic exclusion.
Finally, even if the oft-quoted language from the Celebici Chamber
conveys the view that evidence obtained in violation of Rule 42 ought to
always, or at least almost always, be excluded, not one of the Chambers
217 Statement by the President Made at a Briefing to Members ofDiplomatic Missions,
Summary of the Rules of Procedure at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (1) UN Doc IT/29 (1994), reprinted in VIRGINIA MORRIS & MICHAEL P. SCHARF,
2 AN INSIDER'S GUIDE TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER
YUGOSLAVIA 649 (1995).
218 SALVATORE ZAPPALA, HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
151 (2003).
219 Prosecutor v. Brdjanin & Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Decision on Defence "Objection
to Intercept Evidence", 1 61 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugo. Oct. 3, 2003), available at
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tdec/en/031003.htm (noting, in 1 54, that "it is obvious
that the drafters of the Rules specifically chose not to set out a rule providing for the automatic
exclusion of evidence illegally or unlawfully obtained"). Notably, the Brdjanin Chamber's
analysis of Rule 95 was cited favorably by the Karemera Chamber in its decision to exclude
wrongfully obtained statements. Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision
on the Prosecution Motion for Admission into Evidence of Post-Arrest Interviews with Joseph
Nzirorera and Mathieu Ngirumpatse, 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 2, 2007). See also
Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54T, Decision on Prosecution Motion for Voir Dire
Proceeding (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 9, 2005).
220 Gideon Boas, Creating Laws of Evidence for International Criminal Law: The ICTY
and the Principle of Flexibility, 12 CRIM. L.F. 41, 49 (2001).
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citing the decision was bound to follow it. 221 Considered together, these
observations indicate that the Trial Chambers chose to avail of their
discretionary authority by excluding the wrongfully obtained statements.
And, while the chambers could perhaps have been more explicit in sharing
their reasoning, the decisions rendered certainly provide sufficient evidence
to support exclusion.
In Bagosora, for example, the Trial Chamber. found that the OTP's
investigators proceeded to questioning after the interrogee had invoked his
222right to have counsel present during questioning, while at the same time
failing to correct his "misperception that his right to counsel was conditional
upon being informed of the case against him." 223 The violations in the
Karemera case were even more egregious. In that matter, the Trial Chamber
found that the OTP had ignored the suspect's specific request to have
counsel present, violating Rule 42 by then seeking the suspect's "agreement
to waive his rights to counsel and silence in respect of non-'tendentious' or
'delicate' questions." 224 What is more, the investigator then proceeded with
further questioning despite the fact that the suspect twice refused to answer
questions without counsel present and then expressed his desire to meet with
counsel.225 Finally, in Nchamihigo, a custodial suspect was questioned by an
OTP investigator, without the presence of counsel, despite his having asked
for the assistance of an attorney. 226 Nchamihigo's attorney-less interrogation
continued for two days, notwithstanding his having expressed a desire to
have legal assistance for which he could not pay. The investigator, to whom
"it did not occur" to defer the questioning until the suspect had the benefit of
counsel, 227 later maintained that he was both unaware of the fact that
temporary counsel had at the time of interrogation been appointed to
represent the suspect and, in fact, denied knowing that the tribunal had a
221 Had the pronouncement even been central to the Trial Chamber's decision, the finding
of one Trial Chamber has no binding force on the decisions of other Trial Chambers, even
within the same tribunal. Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1 -A, Judgement, 114
(Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 24, 2000) (noting, however, that the Trial
Chambers are free to follow the decisions of one another).
222 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-4 I-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
for the Admission of Certain Materials under Rule 89(C), 20 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Oct. 14, 2004).
223 Id. 19.
224 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion
for Admission into Evidence of Post-Arrest Interviews with Joseph Nzirorera and Mathieu
Ngirumpatse, at 27 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 2, 2007).
225 Id at % 28-29.
226 Prosecutor v. Nchamihigo, Case No. ICTR-01-63-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's
Application to Admit into Evidence the Transcript of the Accused's Interview as a Suspect and
the Defense's Request to Hold a Voir Dire, 17 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Feb. 5, 2007).
227 Id.at$18.
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practice of appointing temporary counsel.228
The decision in each of these cases was that Rule 95 precluded the
admission of the wrongfully obtained statements, although each Trial
Chamber appeared to find this conclusion nearly self-evident. Indeed, the
Nchamihigo Chamber made only one express reference to the rule.229 To be
fair, however, after delineating the actions on behalf of the OTP, conduct
committed in blatant disregard of the rights and protections expressly
conferred upon the three suspects, it is arguably a small leap to conclude that
their admission would be "antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the
integrity of the proceedings." 230 In fact, the Karemera Chamber took this
one step further, concluding that the continued questioning in the wake of
unanswered requests for counsel meant not only that admitting the
statements would be antithetical to the integrity of the proceedings, but also
rendered the statements unreliable and, therefore, inadmissible under both
prongs of Rule 95.231 These cases therefore suggest that the OTP's violation
of the expressly conferred rights to counsel and silence, despite the presence
of a discretionary exclusionary rule, "will always satisfy one or both prongs
of [Rule 95's] dual test."232 The next section articulates a sound basis for this
pattern and argues that it ought to be followed by the International Criminal
Court.
c. Making Further Sense ofa Robust Practice ofExclusion:
An Imitable Precedent for the ICC
A vigorous approach to exclusion is perhaps best harmonized with the
228 Understandably, the Trial Chamber had a hard time accepting these assertions. "It is
difficult for the Chamber to understand this ignorance . . . ." Id. at T 23.
229 The only reference in fact, is just under the title of the opinion, which reads "Article 17
of the Statute; Rules 42, 43 and 95 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence." Id.
230 Prosecutor v. Bagosora, Case No. ICTR-98-41-T, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion
for the Admission of Certain Materials under Rule 89(C), 1 21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda
Oct. 14, 2004). This is made all the more likely by the fact that the interrogations were
videotaped, providing the judges with the opportunity to personally observe and assess the
misconduct. "Affording the Court the benefit of watching or listening to a videotaped or
audiotaped statement is invaluable." United States v. Lewis, 355 F. Supp. 2d 870, 873 (E.D.
Mich. 2005). On the recording requirement under the shared approach, see, e.g., ICTR RPE,
supra note 42, at R. 43 (requiring audio or video recording whenever the Prosecutor questions
a suspect). This taping requirement, of course, further enhances rights protection in the
international realm. Indeed, U.S. scholars have increasingly called for a taping requirement to
better assure suspect protections. See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Toward Taping, I OHIO ST.
J. CRIM. L. 309 (2003).
231 Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-98-44-T, Decision on the Prosecution Motion
for Admission into Evidence of Post-Arrest Interviews with Joseph Nzirorera and Mathieu
Ngirumpatse, 32 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for Rwanda Nov. 2, 2007).
232 Alamuddin, supra note 177, at 301.
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discretionary exclusionary rules governing international criminal
proceedings in an ICTY decision that, incidentally, better correlates to
Miranda's blanket directive prohibiting the use of statements obtained in the
absence of procedural safeguards,233 than contemporary U.S. practice. 234
Faced with a motion by the OTP to use statements it had improperly
obtained for the limited purpose of impeachment, the Simic Trial Chamber
rejected OTP's argument that the Chamber ought to follow U.S. precedent in
this regard.235 Instead, the Chamber concluded that permitting the use of the
improperly obtained statements, even for a purpose other than establishing
the guilt of the declarant, "would damage the overall fairness and integrity of
the trial. . .in effect[] condon[ing]" the prosecution's misconduct in
obtaining the statements. 236
This latter observation evinces concern for the judicial integrity
rationale,237 an issue that falls squarely within the discretionary rules of
exclusion employed by the three predecessor courts to the ICC. As was
recognized at the time Rule 95 was first adopted at the ICTY, admitting
improper obtained evidence could be seen as tainting the judicial
process. In effect, admitting statements wrongfully obtained would
seriously damage the integrity of these courts' proceedings not simply
because procedural safeguards were disregarded pre-trial, but also because
their admission at trial would implicate the judiciary in that misconduct.240
233 Miranda at 444.
234 See supra notes 184 et. seq. and related text.
235 Prosecutor v. Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution's
Motion to Use Telephone Interviews, T 4 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 11,
2003). As discussed above, in the United States, statements obtained in violation of Miranda
are admissible for the purpose of impeachment. Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
236 Simic, Case No. IT-95-9-T, Reasons for Decision on Prosecution's Motion to Use
Telephone Interviews, at T 8. This emphasis perhaps explains the different outcome in the
Mrksic trial, in which the statements at issue--obtained by non-compliance with the Tribunal's
safeguards not by OTP, but by unrelated non-tribunal actors-were admitted for the purpose of
impeaching the declarant turned accused. Prosecutor v. Mrksic, Case No. IT-95-13/1-T,
Decision Concerning the use of Statements given by the Accused (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Oct. 9, 2006).
237 This reasoning once animated the application of the exclusionary rule in U.S. Fourth
Amendment cases. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). A majority of the Court,
however, has since "ditched the judicial integrity rationale entirely." The Role of Exclusion in
Removal Hearings, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1633, 1636 (2013).
238 "No evidence shall be admissible if . . . its admission is antithetical to, or would
seriously damage the integrity of the proceedings." ICTY RPE, supra note 42, at R. 95; ICTR
RPE, supra note 42, at R. 95. "No evidence shall be admitted if its admission would bring the
administration ofjustice into serious disrepute." SCSL RPE, supra note 42, at R. 95.
239 1 MORRIS & SCHARF, supra note 43, at 261 (remarking as well that the standard
established by the rule was intended to discourage human rights violations).
240 See, e.g., Sharon L. Davies, The Penalty of Exclusion--A Price or Sanction?, 73 S.
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By employing this rationale, chambers that are not in a position to
protect the integrity of the investigator process,24 1 instead protect the
integrity of the adjudicatory process.24 What is more, it is perhaps
increasingly incumbent upon international criminal courts to do just that,
precisely because of their discretionary exclusionary power. As every
decision to admit tainted evidence will-or at least ought to-require an
explanation as to why admission is not antithetical to the integrity of the
proceedings, "[t]he most visible and lasting feature of dismissing motions to
exclude is not their rebuke of the [misconduct], that by now rings hollow,
but judges' justifications for the [violation]. 243
Strict adherence to the judicial integrity rationale, by contrast, not only
assures compliance with the discretionary rule's aim of ensuring the
honorableness of the instant proceedings, it also bolsters the relevant court's
authority in general. Naturally viewed with a type of skepticism generally
unknown to their established, domestic counterparts,244 it is essentially
incumbent upon institutions in this fledgling field of law to self-generate
their authority, establishing their legitimacy "by the quality of justice they
deliver."245
Prioritizing the judicial integrity rationale likewise fosters the ability of
CAL. L. REV. 1275, 1299-1300 (2000) (relaying the arguments in support of the rationale,
including that admission compounds the harm, places a seal of approval on this misconduct
and openly defies constitutional commands).
241 The shared approach does not afford its accused the protections available in continental
systems that derive from a neutral, pre-trial inquiry conducted either by judicial officials or
under judicial supervision. Instead, an adversarial construct is employed, with a prosecutor
whose role is more akin to that of her common law counterparts and who conducts her
investigations without immediate judicial oversight. See, e.g., Megan Fairlie, The Marriage of
Common and Continental Law and its Progeny, Due Process Deficit, 4 INT'L CRIM. L. REV.
243, 248-51, 268 (describing the differences between the pre-trial investigations conducted in
continental systems and those performed at common law and assessing the adversarial
construct in place at the ICTY).
242 See, e.g., Pitcher, supra note 177, at 36 n.201 (opining that when courts are unable to
protect the integrity of the investigatory process, they may nevertheless utilize remedial
measures at trial so as "to protect the integrity of the adjudicatory process").
243 Blum, supra note 180, at 447 (citing injury to judicial reputation and integrity as one of
the "costs of a flexible exclusionary standard").
244 "[O]ne must be realistic about the challenges tribunals face in demonstrating credibly
to the local population that impunity is being punctured for egregious crimes and that justice
can be fair." Jane E. Stromseth, The International Criminal Court and Justice on the Ground,
43 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 427, 435 (2011).
245 David Luban, Fairness to Rightness: Jurisdiction, Legality, and the Legitimacy of
International Criminal Law, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 569, 579
(Samantha Besson & John Tasioulas eds., 2010). See also Mirjan Damaika, Assignment of
Counsel and Perceptions of Fairness, 3 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 3, 4 (2005) (noting that it is
important for "[a]n adolescent justice system . . . with still fragile legitimacy" to be perceived
as fair).
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international criminal courts to meet broader and, some have argued, more
important interests. In order for these courts to "spread human rights
culture," their judges "must be perceived by their audience as fair."246 This
goal would be difficult to meet if international criminal judges are seen to
endorse conduct inapposite to their institutions' procedural protections, and
are thereby deemed lackin in the "judicial integrity so necessary in the true
administration of justice."27
In addition, by virtue of having excluded improperly obtained
statements, the predecessor courts to the ICC kept intact judicial integrity at
seemingly little cost to their prosecutions. As Zahar and Sluiter explain,
suspect statements "are not as important [for these institutions] as in
domestic jurisdictions. There is not the situation of immediate arrest
followed by interrogation, offering a conducive environment for a
confession. The general practice is for an accused person to determine their
,, 248defence strategy and adequately prepare for a trial beforehand. To this
observation one might cynically add that the price of exclusion in the
international realm is further lessened, due to the fact that international
judges serve as finders of both law and fact.249
In sum, while some have puzzled over the "over-protective" approach
to the rights of suspects at the ICTY, ICTR and SCSL250 and still others
have criticized their exclusion of improperly obtained statements as holdings
that "come closer to an automatic exclusion of evidence .. .than the explicit
language of Rule 95 requires,"251 the robust precedent of exclusion
established by these courts both makes sense and aligns well with the
applicable discretionary rules of exclusion. At apparently little cost, the
246 Mirjan Damaika, Keynote Address at the Concluding Conference of the International
Criminal Procedure Expert Framework: General Rules and Principles of International
Criminal Procedure (Oct. 27, 2011) (on file with author).
247 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961).
248 ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 52, at 307 (2008) (describing the approach of
international criminal tribunals as "over-protective from a human rights perspective").
Interestingly, the Miranda Court concluded the 'need' for confessions" in the domestic realm
was likewise overstated, citing Miranda and its three companion cases as "graphic examples"
of this. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 481 (1966).
249 See, e.g., Blum, supra note 180, at 397 (2010) ("[T]he true significance of an
exclusionary rule . . . is derived from bifurcation and the law-finder's ability to conceal the
evidence's content, or even its existence, from the fact-finder."). See also Alphons Orie,
Accusatorial v. Inquisitorial Approach in International Criminal Proceedings Prior to the
Establishment ofthe ICC and in the Proceedings Before the ICC, 'in 2 THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 1439, 1472 (Antonio Cassese, et al.
eds., 2002) (acknowledging that the effectiveness of exclusionary rules is diminished when the
Trial Chamber is responsible for fact finding in addition to ruling on questions of law).
250 See, e.g., ZAHAR & SLUITER, supra note 52, at 307.
25I Alamuddin, supra note 177, at 281.
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decisions in this area dispense the type of "champagne-quality due process"
required for these institutions to establish their legitimacy.2 2 At the same
time, they comport with Rule 95's command that the integrity of the
proceedings remain whole and unharmed, by assuring that the procedural
injury endured by suspects is not compounded by judicial approval of the
misconduct. Finally, with their judiciaries seen as upholding-rather than
defying-the human rights protections their institutions profess to endorse,
the work of these courts becomes more likely to garner the support of the
affected communities and foster respect for the rule of law.
With these reasons in mind, it is of at least equal importance for the
ICC to follow the existing trend of exclusion by refusing to admit statements
obtained in violation of the rights expressly bestowed by the ICC Statute and
Rules. Although a permanent institution, the ICC remains as responsible for
establishing its authority as its ad hoc predecessors. 253 In fact, as the world's
most prominent international criminal justice institution, it is arguably even
more important for the Court to ensure that its procedures are not only fair,
but seen to be fair.254 This the Court can accomplish by opting to not be
complicit-or allowing itself to be perceived as being complicit-in
violations of a suspect's expressly bestowed rights. In this respect, the
argument advanced is not that the ICC should apply an automatic rule of
exclusion that is contrary to the discretionary provision agreed upon in
Rome.255 Rather, it is that, at least in most cases, excluding evidence
obtained in violation of the protections explicitly conferred in Article 55
would advance the statutory aim of ensuring the integrity of the Court's
proceedings. 256
252 Luban, supra note 245, at 580.
253 Id.
254 The fairness inherent in the ICC's procedures addresses the issue of "procedural" or
"normative legitimacy;" the assessments formed regarding the fairness of the Court's
procedures make up the second and more subjective dimension of the concept of legitimacy:
"sociological legitimacy" or "substantive legitimacy." Hitomi Takemura, Reconsidering the
Meaning and Actuality of the Legitimacy of the International Criminal Court, 4 AMSTERDAM
L.F. 3, 5-6 (2012). These two aspects of legitimacy are, of course, intimately related. Id. at 6.
255 Rome Statute, supra note 7, at Art.69 (7)(a) & (b).
256 Id. Ideally, and unlike the example set at the ICTR, ICC decisions to exclude
wrongfully obtained statements would thoughtfully explain why exclusion meets this statutory
goal. When the offending party is the prosecution, this approach should always be feasible. If,
however, a statement is obtained by a state upon whom the ICC is dependent for cooperation, a
Chamber may be more hesitant to make plain that the state's conduct fell so short of the mark
as to render admission of the evidence antithetical and seriously damaging to the integrity of
the proceedings. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-04,
Decision on Prosecutor's Bar Table Motion, 63 (Dec. 17, 2010) (omitting this discussion
from the Chamber's decision to exclude the statements obtained by Congolese authorities
under rather troubling conditions).
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IV. CONCLUSION
Despite the high esteem in which the Miranda decision is popularly
held, the doctrine created in its wake in the United States has moved
increasingly afield from the tenor and aims of the seminal opinion. Through
a series of incremental incursions, Miranda 's ability to protect the rights of
U.S suspects has grown ever weaker and promises to become feebler still.
As this work demonstrates, the diminution of Miranda persists under the
Roberts Court, which has contributed to the serious curtailment of the
applicability of Miranda's warnings and has further diminished the
prosecution's burden in establishing waiver, guaranteeing that Miranda 's
goal of protecting vulnerable suspects from compelled interrogation will be
progressively thwarted.
By contrast "international Miranda" goes a long way towards fulfilling
Miranda's purposes in a manner that is not only more in step with the
language and goals of the 1966 opinion, but is also more rights-protective
than current U.S practice. As has been demonstrated, this enhanced
conformity with Miranda extends beyond the requirements governing
suspect interrogations; it is also evinced in the remedial responses to rights
violations. While current Miranda doctrine makes clear that an automatic
exclusionary rule is not automatically more rights-protective, existing
international jurisprudence dispels the notion that a discretionary
exclusionary rule, by definition, will be less so.
Because of the unique status of international criminal courts,
conformity with Miranda's mandate of exclusion whenever expressly
bestowed rights of international suspects are violated is an important
practice that ensures the integrity of international criminal proceedings and
spares the administration of justice from being brought into disrepute. In
effect, the fragility of the novel institutions that comprise this fledgling field
of international law, coupled with the exclusionary rules they have adopted,
dictate that they adhere to this "more majestic conception" of exclusion.
It is now incumbent upon the International Criminal Court to stay this
more majestic course. Doing so will help to dispel lingering concerns about
the fairness of international criminal practice, in particular that of its only
permanent institution. This, in turn, will enhance the ICC's credibility, not
only within the communities affected by its prosecutions, but also in the eyes
of states that support the Court's work and those yet to do so. If ICC judges
assume their designated role as "moral teachers," 58 the results yielded may
extend beyond the ICC's ability to foster the rule of law in post-conflict
states. Perhaps if Americans discover that Miranda is not "on life support or
257 See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 151-52 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
258 Damaika, Keynote, supra note 246.
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clinically dead,"259 but alive, well, and living abroad, we might be inspired
to take the steps necessary to bring Miranda home.
259 Garcia, supra note 195, at 462.
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